# Wiki Doc Triples

## 1NC

### 1NC – FW – Info Reflexivity

#### Interpretation – affs must defend hypothetical enactment of a United States federal government policy that substantially increases prohibitions on anticompetitive business practices by the private sector by at least expanding the scope of its core antitrust laws

#### Resolved means to enact a policy by law.

Words & Phrases 64. [Words and Phrases; 1964; Permanent Edition]

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or **determination by resolution or vote**; as ‘it was resolved **by the legislature**;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as **meaning “to establish by law”**.

#### The United States federal government is the national government in DC.

Black’s Law 4. [Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th Edition, June 1, 2004, pg.716]

Federal government. 1. A **national government** that exercises some degree of control over smaller political units that have surrendered some degree of power in exchange for the right to participate in national politics matters – Also termed (in federal states) **central government**. 2. **the U.S. government** – Also **termed national government**. [Cases: United States -1 C.J.S. United States - - 2-3]

#### ‘Core antitrust laws’ means Sherman, Clayton, and FTC

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At the federal level, there are three core antitrust laws: (1) the Sherman Act, in which Section 1 outlaws "every contract, combination, or conspiracy in [unreasonable] restraint of trade," and Section 2 outlaws any "monopolization, attempted monopolization, or conspiracy or combination to monopolize";1 (2) the Federal Trade Commission Act, which prohibits "unfair methods of competition" and "unfair or deceptive acts or practices";2 and (3) Section 7 of the Clayton Act, which prohibits mergers and acquisitions where the effect "may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly."3 Criminal violations of the Sherman Act carry a maximum penalty of a $100 million fine for corporations, and a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison and a $1 million fine for individuals. A prevailing plaintiff in a civil suit can recover treble damages and attorneys' fees. But federal law currently does not provide for civil penalties when the government brings an antitrust case, only injunctive relief.

#### That’s key to predictability -- only an interp grounded in relevant legal literature gives debaters the basis to prepare negatives and affirmatives guaranteed to clash. There are a few impacts –

#### First is competitive equity – without predictable preparation and a stable stasis point, there is an aff side bias that destroys the competitive nature of the activity and participation – equity is obviously an impact because debate is a game that is key to the aff – if not, just vote neg

#### Second is information reflexivity --

#### The process of debate around a predictable governmental plan best creates the conditions for informed learning and well-rounded information gathering through a holistic research approach – the impact is information reflexivity – issues of factual evidence are difficult to resolve and require informed processes and information vetting to counter problematic premises that result in material violence like the Iraq war – only a model of debate that encourages 2nd and 3rd level argument testing, considers unintended consequences, and promotes conditional and dynamic argumentation will foster well informed decisions and self-efficacy

Leek 16. [Danielle R. Leek, Johns Hopkins University Advanced Academic Programs instructor, Director of Academic Innovation and Distance Education at Bunker Hill Community College, former executive director of the communications center and professor of communications at Grand Valley State University, “Policy debate pedagogy: a complementary strategy for civic and political engagement through service-learning,” Communication Education, 65:4, 401-405]

In policy debate, students are asked to consider whether a particular course of action should be taken, generally by state institutions such as the United States federal government, or its respective branches, such as the Supreme Court or the Congress (Snider & Schnurer, 2002). A policy debate can involve any institutional actor or agent such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the United Nations, the International Criminal Court, and so on. Questions of policy can address broad global issues, such as “Should the United States federal government sign a new nuclear treaty with Iran?” Or they might consider narrow rules for legal action, such as“Should the Michigan Department of Treasury require individuals to pay taxes online?” When connected to a service-learning experience, educators might set aside time for students to debate a relevant policy question. Using previous examples, students working on the health campaign might also be asked to debate the question, “Should the City of Grand Rapids provide mobile health clinics in the downtown area?” Chemistry students could debate, “Should the federal government require a universal science curriculum in all high schools?” No matter the topic, students should have the opportunity to engage multiple perspectives on the question, including speaking on the affirmative to support a new policy and on the negative in opposition to a change in the status quo. Students may be asked to work with one or more partners to research and develop materials that can be used in their speeches or in question-and-answer periods related to their arguments.

Especially for readers familiar with extracurricular policy debate competitions in high schools or college, this depiction of what policy debate entails may seem overly simplistic. Yet, even basic consideration of policy issues related to a service-learning experience can improve a student’s odds of political learning. Through policy debate, students can develop information literacy and learn how to make critical arguments of fact. This experience is politically empowering for students who will also build confidence for political engagement.

Information literacy

While there are many definitions of information literacy, the term generally is understood to mean that a student is “able to recognize when information is needed, and have the ability to locate, evaluate, and use effectively the information needed” for problem-solving and decision-making (Spitzer, Eisenberg, & Lowe, 1998, p. 19). Information exists in a variety of forms, in visual data, computer graphics, sound-recordings, film, and photographs. Information is also constructed and disseminated through a wide range of sources and mediums. Therefore, “information literacy” functions as a blanket term which covers a wide range of more specific literacies. Critiques of service-learning’s knowledge-building power, such as those articulated by Eby (1998) and Colby (2008), are challenging both the emphasis the pedagogy places on information gained through experience and the limited scope of political information students are exposed to in the process.

Policy debate can augment a student’s civic and political learning by fostering extended information literacies. Snider and Schnurer (2002) identify policy debate as an especially research intensive form of oral discussion which requires extensive time and commitment to learn the dimensions of a topic. Understanding policy issues calls for contemplating a range of materials, from traditional news media publications to court proceedings, research data, and institutional propaganda. Moreover, the nature of policy debate, which involves public presentation of arguments on two competing sides of a question, motivates students to go beyond basic information to achieve a more advanced level of expertise and credibility on a topic (Dybvig & Iverson, n.d.). This type of work differs from traditional research projects where students gather only the materials needed to support their argument while neglecting contrary evidence. Instead, the “debate research process encourages a kind of holistic approach, where students need to pay attention to the critics of their argument because they will have to respond to those attacks” (Snider & Schnurer, 2002, p. 32). In today’s attention economy, cultivating a sensibility for well-rounded information gathering can also aid students in recognizing when and how the knowledge produced in their social environments can be effectively translated to specific contexts. The “cultural shift in the production of data” which has followed the emergence of Web 2.0 technologies means that all students are likely “prosumers”—that is, they consume, produce, and coproduce information online all at the same time (Scoble, 2011).

Coupling service- learning with policy debate calls on students to apply information across registers of public engagement, including their own service efforts and their own public argumentation, in and outside of their debates. Information is used in the service experience, which in turn, informs the use of information in debates, where students then produce new information through their argumentation. The process is what Bruce (2008) refers to “informed learning,” or “using information in order to learn.” When individuals move from learning how to gather materials for a task to a cognitive awareness and understanding of how the information-seeking process shapes their learning, they are engaged in informed learning. Through this process, students can come to recognize that information management and credibility is deeply disciplinary and historically contextual (Bruce & Hughes, 2010). This understanding, combined with practical experience in locating information, is a critical missing element in contemporary political engagement. Over 20 years ago, Graber (1994) argued that one of the biggest obstacles to political engagement was not apathy, but a gap between the way news media presents information during elections, and the type of information voters need and will listen to during electoral campaigns. The challenge extends beyond elections into policy-making, especially as younger generations continue to revise their notions of citizenship away from institutional politics towards more social forms of activism (Bennett, Wells, & Freelon, 2011). For students to effectively practice more expressive forms of citizenship they need experience managing the breadth of information available about issues they care about. As past research indicates a strong correlation between service-learning experience and the motivation and desire for post-graduation service, it seems likely that students who debate about policy issues related to service areas will continue their informed learning practices after they have left the classroom (Soria & Thomas-Card, 2014).

Arguing facts

In addition to building information literacies, students who combine policy debate with service-learning can practice “politically relevant skills,” which will help them have confidence for political engagement in the future. As Colby (2008) explains, this confidence should be tempered by tolerance for difference and differing opinions. On the surface, debating about institutional politics might seem counterintuitive to this goal. Politicians and the press have a credibility problem among college-aged students, and this leaves younger generations less inclined to feel obligated to the state or to look to traditional modes of policymaking for social change (Bennett et al., 2011; Manning & Edwards, 2014). This lack of faith in government and media outlets also makes political argument more difficult (Klumpp, 2006). Whereas these institutions once served as authoritative and trustworthy sources of information, the credibility of legislators and journalists has decreased over the last 40 years or so. Today, politicians and pundits are viewed as political actors interested in spectacle, power, and profit rather than truth-seeking or the common good.

While some political controversies are rooted in competing values, Klumpp (2006) explains that arguments about policy are more often based in fact. Indeed, when engaged in public arguments over questions of policy, people tend to “invoke the authority of facts to support their positions.” Likewise, “the governmental sphere has developed elaborate legal and deliberative processes in recognition of the power of facts as the basis for a decision.” Yet, while shared values are often quickly agreed upon, differences over fact are more difficult to resolve. Without credible institutions of authority that can disseminate facts, public deliberation requires more time, information-gathering, evaluation, and reasoning. The Bush administration’s decision to take military action in Iraq, for example, was presumably based on the “fact” that Saddam Hussein had acquired weapons of mass destruction. This has now become a classic example of poor policy-making grounded in faulty factual evidence.

This shortcoming is precisely why policy debate is a valuable complement to servicelearning activities. Not only can students use their developing literacies to better understand social problems, they can also learn to access a broader range of knowledge sources, thereby mitigating the absence of fact-finding from traditional institutions. Furthermore, policy advocacy gives students experience testing the reasoning underlying claims of fact. Issues of source credibility, analogic comparisons, and data analysis are three examples of the type of critical thinking skills that students may need to apply in order to engage a question of policy (Allen, Berkowitz, Hunt, & Louden, 1999). While the effect may be to undermine government action in some instances, in others students will gain a better understanding of when and where institutional activities can work to make change. As students gain knowledge about the relationship between institutional structures and the communities they serve, they grow confidence in their ability to engage in future conversations about policy issues. Zwarensteyn’s (2012) research highlights these sorts of effects in high school students who engage in competitive policy debate. Zwarensteyn theorizes that even minimal increases in technical knowledge about politics can translate to significant increases in a student’s sense of self-efficacy. Many students start off feeling very insecure when it comes to their mastery of institutional politics; policy debate helps overcome that insecurity. Moreover, because training in policy debate encourages students to address issues as arguments rather than partisan positions, it encourages them to engage policy-making without the hostility and incivility that often characterizes today’s political scene. Indeed, it is precisely that perceived hostility and incivility that prompts many young people to avoid politics in the first place.

I do not mean to imply that students who debate about their service-learning experiences will draw homogenous conclusions about policies. Quite the contrary. Students who engage in service-learning still bring their personal visions and history to bear on their debates. As a result, students will often have very different opinions after engaging in a shared debate experience. More importantly, the practice of debating should operate to particularize students’ knowledge of community partners and clients, working against the destructive generalizations and power dynamics that can result when students feel privileged to serve less fortunate “others.” For civic and political engagement through service-learning to be meaningful and productive, it must do more to challenge students’ concepts of the homogenous “we” who helps “them.” Seligman (2013) argues that this civic spirit can be cultivated through the core pedagogical principle of a “shared practice,” which emphasizes the application of knowledge to purpose (p. 60). Policy debate achieves this outcome by calling on students to consider and reconsider their understanding of themselves, institutions, community, and policy every time the question “should” may arise. As Seligman writes:

… the orientation of thought to purpose (having an explanation rest at a place, a purpose) is of extreme importance. We must recognize that the orientation of thought to purpose is to recognize moving from providing a knowledge of, to providing a knowledge for. This means that in the context of encountering difference it is not sufficient to learn about (have an idea of) the other, rather it means to have ideas for certain joint purposes—for a set of “to-does.” A purpose becomes the goal towards which our explanations should be oriented. (p. 61)

Put another way, policy debate challenges students “to maintain a sense of doubt and to carry on a systematic and protracted inquiry” in the process of service-learning itself (Seligman, 2013, p. 60). This is precisely the type of complex, ongoing, reflective inquiry that John Dewey had in mind.

Political engagement through policy debate

This essay began with a discussion of the growing attention to civic engagement programs in higher education. The national trend is to accomplish higher levels of student civic responsibility during and after their time in college through service-learning experiences tied to curricular learning objectives. A challenge for service-learning scholars and teachers is to recognize a distinction between civic activities that are accomplished by helping others and political activities that require engagement with the collective institutional structures and processes that govern social life. Both are necessary for democracy to thrive. Policy debate pedagogy can help service-learning educators accomplish these dual objectives.

To call policy debate a pedagogy rather than just a style of debate is purposeful. A pedagogy is a praxis for cultivating learning in others. The pedagogy of service-learning helps students to know and engage social conditions through physical engagement with their environments and communities. Policy debate pedagogy leads students to know and engage these same social conditions while also challenging them to apply their knowledge for the purpose of political advocacy. These pedagogies are natural compliments for cultivating student learning. Therefore, future studies should explore how well service-learning combined with policy debate can resolve concerns that policy debate alone does not go far enough to invest students with political agency (Mitchell, 1998). The present analysis suggests the potential for such an outcome is likely.

Moreover, research is clear that the civic effects of service-learning as an instructional method are improved simply by increasing the amount of time spent on in-class discussion about the service work students do (Levesque-Bristol, Knapp, & Fisher, 2010). Policy debates related to students’ service can accomplish this goal and more. Policy debates can also facilitate the political learning students need to build their political efficacy and capacity for political engagement. Through informed learning about the political process—especially in the context of service practice—students develop literacies that will extend beyond the classroom. Using this knowledge in reasoned public argument about policy challenges invites students to move beyond cynical disengagement towards a productive recognition of their own potential voice in the political world.

Policy debate pedagogy brings unique elements to the process of political learning. By emphasizing the conditional and dynamic nature of political arguments and processes, debates can work to relieve students of the misconception that there is a single “right answer” for questions about policy-making and politics, especially during election time. The communication perspective on policy debates also highlights students’ collective involvement in the ever-changing field of political terms, symbols, and meanings that constitute interpretations of our social world. In fact, the historical roots of the term “communication” seem to demand that speech and debate educators call for such emphasis on political learning. “To make common,” the Latin interpretation of communicare, situates our discipline as the heart of public political affairs (Peters, 1999). Connecting policy debate to service-learning helps highlight the common purpose of these approaches in efforts to promote civic engagement in higher education.

#### You should also filter their impacts through predictable testability and model comparison -- debate inherently judges relative truth value by whether or not it gets answered -- a combination of a less predictable case neg, the burden of rejoinder, and them starting a speech ahead will always inflate the value of their impacts, which makes non-arbitrarily weighing whether they should have read the 1ac in the first place impossible within the structure of a debate round so even if we lose framework, vote neg on presumption. They also create a moral hazard that leads to affs only about individual self-care so even if you think this aff is answerable, the ones they incentivize are not, so assume the worst possible affirmative when weighing our impacts.

### 1NC – Case

#### Neolib is resilient – global resistance proves

Igor Guardiancich 17, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and Public Management of the University of Southern Denmark, 3/3/2017, “Absorb, Coopt and Recast: Global Neoliberalism’s Resilience through Local Translation”, http://www.euvisions.eu/neoliberalisms-resilience-translation/

One powerful message permeating the book, and which gives a forceful explanation to Colin Crouch’s punchy title is that: “rather than a mass-produced, slightly shrunk, and off-the-rack ideological suit, neoliberalism is a bespoke outfit made from a dynamic fabric that absorbs local color” (5). Even under a full-out attack against some of its basic assumptions, such as the one unleashed in the immediate wake of the global financial crisis, neoliberalism proved resilient beyond its many architects’ wildest dreams. Its capacity to absorb, coopt and recast selected ideas of oppositional social forces has been the most valuable asset guaranteeing its survival. Again, the comparison of the responses to the crisis in Spain and Romania show such adaptability in full.¶ The socialist government of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero tried to salvage the social-democratic legacies of the Spanish economy by engineering a Keynesian rescue package. Only later, when the disaster of the cajas became apparent and the emergency intensified, did conservative PM Mariano Rajoy embrace more deregulation in the labour market (inspired by the Hartz IV reform) and extensive cuts in the public sector under the strong external pressure of the European Central Bank and of international financial markets.¶ In Romania, local policymakers further radicalized in the aftermath of the Lehman Brothers’ crisis, thereby outbidding the IMF on austerity and structural reforms. Instead of shielding lower-income groups, the opposite strategy of upward redistribution was chosen. By heroically withstanding the external attempts at moderation, the Romanian economy retained an unenviable mix of libertarian achievements (flat-tax rates), experimental neoliberalism (privatized pensions) and mainstream neoliberal orthodoxy (sound finance, labour market deregulation, social policy targeting, privatization of all public companies). Pure laissez-faire ideas such as the replacement of the welfare state by a voluntary, private, Christian charity system were not unheard of.¶ Hence, through an insightful analysis of the ideational underpinnings of its local interpretations, this book shows us that, despite the challenges, neoliberalism is alive and kicking. Ban guides us through half a century of policymaking in Spain and Romania, and embeds his analysis within the related nuances of contemporary liberal economic thought. The research is a valuable addition to a growing literature on the origin of current ideational frames and comfortably sits alongside contemporary classics, such as Mark Blyth’s Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea.

#### No mindset shift

Heinberg 15—Senior Fellow-in-Residence of the Post Carbon Institute (Richard, “The Anthropocene: It’s Not All About Us”, <http://www.postcarbon.org/the-anthropocene-its-not-all-about-us/>, dml)

It’s hard to convince people to voluntarily reduce consumption and curb reproduction. That’s not because humans are unusually pushy, greedy creatures; all living organisms tend to maximize their population size and rate of collective energy use. Inject a colony of bacteria into a suitable growth medium in a petri dish and watch what happens. Hummingbirds, mice, leopards, oarfish, redwood trees, or giraffes: in each instance the principle remains inviolate—every species maximizes population and energy consumption within nature’s limits. Systems ecologist Howard T. Odum called this rule the Maximum Power Principle: throughout nature, “system designs develop and prevail that maximize power intake, energy transformation, and those uses that reinforce production and efficiency.”

In addition to our innate propensity to maximize population and consumption, we humans also have difficulty making sacrifices in the present in order to reduce future costs. We’re genetically hardwired to respond to immediate threats with fight-or-flight responses, while distant hazards matter much less to us. It’s not that we don’t think about the future at all; rather, we unconsciously apply a discount rate based on the amount of time likely to elapse before a menace has to be faced.

True, there is some variation in future-anticipating behavior among individual humans. A small percentage of the population may change behavior now to reduce risks to forthcoming generations, while the great majority is less likely to do so. If that small percentage could oversee our collective future planning, we might have much less to worry about. But that’s tough to arrange in democracies, where people, politicians, corporations, and even nonprofit organizations get ahead by promising immediate rewards, usually in the form of more economic growth. If none of these can organize a proactive response to long-range threats like climate change, the actions of a few individuals and communities may not be so effective at mitigating the hazard.

This pessimistic expectation is borne out by experience. The general outlines of the 21st century ecological crisis have been apparent since the 1970s. Yet not much has actually been accomplished through efforts to avert that crisis. It is possible to point to hundreds, thousands, perhaps even millions of imaginative, courageous programs to reduce, recycle, and reuse—yet the overall trajectory of industrial civilization remains relatively unchanged.

#### Alt fails and causes transition wars/extinction.

Smith '19 [Noah; 4/5/19; Bloomberg Opinion columnist, former assistant professor of finance at Stony Brook University; "Dumping Capitalism Won’t Save the Planet," https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-04-05/capitalism-is-more-likely-to-limit-climate-change-than-socialism]

It has become fashionable on social media and in certain publications to argue that capitalism is killing the planet. Even renowned investor Jeremy Grantham, hardly a radical, made that assertion last year. The basic idea is that the profit motive drives the private sector to spew carbon into the air with reckless abandon. Though many economists and some climate activists believe that the problem is best addressed by modifying market incentives with a carbon tax, many activists believe that the problem can’t be addressed without rebuilding the economy along centrally planned lines.

The climate threat is certainly dire, and carbon taxes are unlikely to be enough to solve the problem. But eco-socialism is probably not going to be an effective method of addressing that threat. Dismantling an entire economic system is never easy, and probably would touch off armed conflict and major asdasd upheaval. In the scramble to win those battles, even the socialists would almost certainly abandon their limitation on fossil-fuel use — either to support military efforts, or to keep the population from turning against them. The precedent here is the Soviet Union, whose multidecade effort to reshape its economy by force amid confrontation with the West led to profound environmental degradation. The world's climate does not have several decades to spare.

Even without international conflict, there’s little guarantee that moving away from capitalism would mitigate our impact on the environment. Since socialist leader Evo Morales took power in Bolivia, living standards have improved substantially for the average Bolivian, which is great. But this has come at the cost of higher emissions. Meanwhile, the capitalist U.S managed to decrease its per capita emissions a bit during this same period (though since the U.S. is a rich country, its absolute level of emissions is much higher).

In other words, in terms of economic growth and carbon emissions, Bolivia looks similar to more capitalist developing countries. That suggests that faced with a choice of enriching their people or helping to save the climate, even socialist leaders will often choose the former. And that same political calculus will probably hold in China and the U.S., the world’s top carbon emitters — leaders who demand draconian cuts in living standards in pursuit of environmental goals will have trouble staying in power.

The best hope for the climate therefore lies in reducing the tradeoff between material prosperity and carbon emissions. That requires technology — solar, wind and nuclear power, energy storage, electric cars and other vehicles, carbon-free cement production and so on. The best climate policy plans all involve technological improvement as a key feature.

#### Cap’s sustainable thanks to dematerialization and the alt’s transition fails.

McAfee, 20—cofounder and codirector of the MIT Initiative on the Digital Economy at the MIT Sloan School of Management, former professor at Harvard Business School and fellow at Harvard’s Berkman Center for Internet and Society (Andrew, “Why Degrowth Is the Worst Idea on the Planet,” <https://www.wired.com/story/opinion-why-degrowth-is-the-worst-idea-on-the-planet/>, dml)

Over that same span, an unexpected and encouraging pattern has emerged: The world's richest countries have learned how to reduce their footprint on Earth. They're polluting less, using less land and water, consuming smaller amounts of important natural resources, and doing better in many other ways. Some of these trends are also now visible in less affluent countries.

However, many in the degrowth movement seem to have trouble taking yes for an answer. The claims I just made are widely resisted or ignored. Some say they’ve been debunked. Of course, debate over empirical claims like these is normal and healthy. Our impact on our planet is hugely important. But something less healthy is at work here. As Upton Sinclair put it, “It is difficult to get a man to understand something when his salary depends upon his not understanding it.” Some voices in the conversation about the environment seem wedded to the idea that degrowth is necessary, and they are unwilling or unable to walk away from it, no matter the evidence.

But evidence remains a powerful way to persuade the persuadable. The one thing everyone agrees on is that the last 50 years have been a period of growth, not degrowth. In fact, growth has never been faster, except for the 25-year rebuilding period after World War II. The population and economic growth rates of the past half-century are remarkably fast by historical standards. Between 1800 and 1945, for example, the world’s economy grew less than 1.5 percent per year, on average. Between 1970 and 2019, that average increased to almost 3.5 percent.

It's natural to assume that, as this growth continued, every nation’s planetary footprint would only increase. After all, as people become more numerous and prosperous they consume more, and producing all the goods and services they consume uses up resources, takes over ecosystems, and generates pollution. The logic seems ironclad that our gains have to be the environment’s losses.

Easing Pollution, Not Exporting It

In some important areas, however, a very different pattern emerged after 1970: Growth continued, but environmental harm decreased. This decoupling occurred first with pollution, and first in the rich world. In the US, for example, aggregate levels of six common air pollutants have declined by 77 percent, even as gross domestic product increased by 285 percent and population by 60 percent. In the UK, annual tonnage of particulate emissions dropped by more than 75 percent between 1970 and 2016, and of the main polluting chemicals by about 85 percent. Similar gains are common across the highest-income countries.

How were these reductions achieved? The two possibilities are cleanup and offshoring. Either rich countries figured out how to reduce their “air pollution per dollar” so much that overall pollution went down even as their economies grew, or they sent so much of their dirty production overseas that the air at home got cleaner. The first of these paths reduces the total burden of human-caused pollution; the second just rearranges it.

The evidence is overwhelming that rich countries cleaned up their air pollution much more than they outsourced it. For one, a great deal of air pollution comes from highway vehicles and power plants, and rich countries haven’t outsourced driving and generating electricity to low-income ones. In fact, high-income countries haven't even offshored most of their industry. The US and UK both manufacture more than they did 50 years ago (at least until the Covid-19 pandemic sharply reduced output), and Germany has been a net exporter since 2000 while continuing to drive down air pollution. The rest of the world has been exporting its manufacturing pollution to Germany (to use degrowthers’ phrasing), yet Germans are breathing cleaner air than they were 20 years ago.

Rich countries have reduced their air pollution not by embracing degrowth or offshoring, but instead by enacting and enforcing smart regulation. As economists Joseph Shapiro and Reed Walker concluded in a 2018 study about the US, “changes in environmental regulation, rather than changes in productivity and trade, account for most of the emissions reductions.” Research about the cleanup of US waters also concludes that well-designed and enforced regulations have successfully reduced pollution.

It is true that the US and other rich countries now import lots of products from China and other nations with higher pollution levels. But if there were no international trade at all, and rich countries had to rely exclusively on their domestic industries to make everything they consume, they’d still have much cleaner air and water than they did 50 years ago. As a 2004 Advances in Economic Analysis and Policy study summarized: “We find no evidence that domestic production of pollution-intensive goods in the US is being replaced by imports from overseas.”

The rich world’s success at decoupling growth from pollution is an inconvenient fact for degrowthers. Even more inconvenient is China's recent success at doing the same. China’s export-led, manufacturing-heavy economy has been growing at meteoric rates, but between 2013 and 2017 air pollution in densely populated areas declined by more than 30 percent. Here again the government mandated and monitored pollution declines and so decoupled growth from an important category of environmental harm.

Prosperity Bends the Curve

China's progress with air pollution is heartening, but it's not surprising to most economists. It's a clear example of the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) in action. Named for the economist Simon Kuznets, EKC posits a relationship between a country's affluence and the condition of its environment. As GDP per capita rises from an initial low level, so too does environmental damage; but as affluence continues to increase, the harms level off and then start to decline. The EKC is clearly visible in the pollution histories of today's rich countries, and it's now taking shape in China and elsewhere.

Also consider air pollution death rates around the world. As the invaluable website Our World in Data puts it, “Rates have typically fallen across high-income countries: almost everywhere in Europe, but also in Canada, the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Israel and South Korea and other countries. But rates have also fallen across upper-middle income countries too, including China and Brazil. In low and lower-middle income countries, rates have increased over this period.”

The EKC is a direct refutation of a core idea of degrowth: that environmental harms must always rise as populations and economies do. It's not surprising that today's degrowth advocates rarely discuss the large reductions in air and water pollution that have accompanied higher prosperity in so many places around the world. Instead, degrowthers now focus heavily on one kind of pollution: greenhouse gas emissions.

The claims made are familiar ones: that any apparent reductions in greenhouse gas emissions in rich countries are due to offshoring rather than actual decarbonization. Thanks to the Global Carbon Project, we can see if this is the case. GCP has calculated “consumption-based emissions” for many countries going back to 1990, taking into account imports and exports, yielding the greenhouse gas emissions embodied in all the goods and services consumed in each country each year.

For several of the world's richest countries, including Germany, Italy, France, the UK, and the US, graphs of consumption-based carbon emissions follow the familiar EKC. The US, for example, has 22reduced its total (not per capita) consumption-based CO2 emissions by more than 13 percent since 2007.

These reductions are not mainly due to enhanced regulation. Instead, they've come about because of a combination of tech progress and market forces. Solar and wind power have become much cheaper in recent years and have displaced coal for electricity generation. Natural gas, which when burned emits fewer greenhouse gases per unit of energy than does coal (even after taking methane leakage into account), has also become much cheaper and more abundant in the US as a result of the fracking revolution.

To ensure that these greenhouse gas declines continue to spread and accelerate, we should apply the lessons we've learned from previous pollution reduction success. In particular, we should make it expensive to emit carbon, then watch the emitters work hard to reduce this expense. The best way to do this is with a carbon dividend, which is a tax on carbon emissions where the revenues are not kept by the government but instead are rebated to people as a dividend. William Nordhaus won the 2018 Nobel Prize in economics in part for his work on the carbon dividend, and an open letter advocating its implementation in the US has been signed by more than 3,500 economists. It's an idea whose time has come.

How We Learned to Lighten Up

Tech progress and price pressure aren't just leading to the demise of coal. They're also causing us to exploit the planet less in many other important ways, even as growth continues. In other words, EKCs are not just about pollution any more.

A good place to start examining this broad phenomenon of getting more from less is US agriculture, where we have decades of data on both outputs—crop tonnage—and the key inputs of cropland, water, and fertilizer. Domestic crop tonnage has risen steadily over the years and in 2015 was more than 55 percent higher than in 1980. Over that same period, though, total water used for irrigation declined by 18 percent, total cropland by more than 7 percent. That is, over that 35-year period, US crop agriculture increased its output by more than half while giving an area of land larger than Indiana back to nature and eventually using a Lake Champlain less water each year. This was not accomplished by increasing fertilizer use; total US fertilizer consumption in 2014 (the most recent year for which data are available) was within 2 percent of its 1980 level.

The three main fertilizers of nitrogen, potassium, and phosphorus (NKP) are an interesting case study. Their total US consumption (once other uses in addition to agriculture are taken into account) has declined by 23 percent since 1980, according to the United States Geological Survey. Yet some within the degrowth movement find ways to argue that these declines are also an illusion. These materials thus serve to clearly illustrate the differences in methodology, evidence, and worldview between ecomodernists like myself and degrowthers.

The USGS tracks annual domestic production, imports, and exports of NKP and uses these figures to calculate “apparent consumption” each year. Consumption of each of the three resources has declined by 16 percent or more from their peaks, which occurred no later than 1998. This seems like a clear and convincing example of dematerialization—getting more output from fewer material inputs.

As I argue in my book More From Less, dematerialization doesn’t happen for any complicated or idiosyncratic reason. It happens because resources cost money that companies would rather not spend, and tech progress keeps opening up new ways to produce more output (like crops) while spending less on material inputs (like fertilizers). Modern digital technologies are so good at helping producers get more from less that they're now allowing the US and other technologically sophisticated countries to use less in total of important materials like NKP.

Forest products provide another clear example of dematerialization in the US. Total annual domestic consumption of paper and paperboard peaked in 1999, and of timber in 2002. Both totals have since declined by more than 20 percent. Could these be mirages caused by offshoring that’s not properly captured? That’s highly unlikely, as the country is now onshoring more than it’s offshoring. The US has been a net exporter of forest products since 2009 and is now the world’s largest exporter of these materials.

Is the US economy also dematerializing its use of metals? Probably, but it’s hard to say for sure. The USGS tallies do show dematerialization in steel, aluminum, copper, and other important metals. But these figures don’t include the metals contained in imports of finished goods like cars and computers. America is a net importer of manufactured goods, so it could be that we’re using more metal year after year, but that much of this consumption is “hidden” from official statistics because of imports of heavy, complex products. However, my estimates indicate that this is extremely unlikely and that the country is in fact now reducing its overall consumption of metals.

Constructing a Weak Argument

Degrowth exponent Jason Hickel responds to this broad evidence of dematerialization by making once again the shopworn argument that there are no real environmental gains; there’s only globalization of harms. Hickel has argued repeatedly that once offshoring is properly taken into account, dematerialization vanishes. How can this be, when tallies take into account imports and exports of raw materials like NKP, timber, and paper? Because, he contends, they don't take into account the true “material footprint” of production around the world.

At this point the degrowth argument departs from reality. I mean literally. As “The Material Footprint of Nations” (the main paper Hickel cites) states, material footprint measures do “not record the actual physical movement of materials within and among countries.” Instead, they’re derived from a “calculation framework [that] … enumerates the link between the beginning of a production chain (where raw materials are extracted from the natural environment) and its end.”

Material footprint models estimate the total weight of all the materials disturbed by humans around the world as they produce the goods they eventually consume. All of the ores mined to make metal, the rock quarried to make gravel, the sand scooped up to make glass and microchips—all of these are estimated by country by year in the material footprint calculation framework.

A nation’s material footprint, then, is always higher than its direct material consumption (DMC). This is straightforward enough. What’s puzzling is that according to “The Material Footprint of Nations,” some rich countries are seeing their footprint go up even as their consumption goes down. The paper shows that many countries are now dematerializing. DMC has been trending downward for some time in the US, UK, and Japan and may recently have peaked for the European Union and OECD as a whole. Yet in all these cases, the material footprint continues to rise.

How can this be? It’s not because the material footprint models do a better job than the USGS of accounting for the metals and other materials in finished goods imports. The technical annex for the global material flows database notes that, as is the case with the USGS tallies, “complex manufactured items are largely excluded.” Instead, the paper notes, “the main reason in most cases was increased indirect use of (dependency on) construction materials.”

This is problematic, because those materials are so poorly tracked. As the appendix states, “Many countries have no data on extraction of non-metallic minerals primarily used for construction … When they are available, they are often unreliable, partial, and underreported.” It’s a poor strategy to use sparse, low-quality data to overturn conclusions based on uniform, high-quality data, yet this is what Hickel is doing when he argues that material footprint calculations show dematerialization is an illusion.

There’s one other serious problem with this argument. It’s based largely on the estimated “raw material equivalents” of Chinese exports of construction minerals, yet China is not at all a big exporter of these minerals. Instead, China’s main exports are electrical and mechanical machinery, plastics, furniture, apparel, and vehicles. None of these contain a lot of sand, gravel, stone, or clay.

So then how do such huge quantities of these and other construction minerals end up somehow being counted among China’s exports? Because China is building a lot of factories, railroads, highways, and other industrial infrastructure each year. The materials footprint calculation framework estimates how much tonnage of construction minerals all this building requires, then allocates about one third of this tonnage to exports. So by this logic, the smartphones and solar panels the US imported from China in, say, 2018 “contain” some of the stone and gravel used to build up China that year. By that same logic, if my neighbors bring me a cake the same year they renovate their house, then my consumption of lumber, drywall, and copper pipe goes up as soon as I have a slice.

Hickel doesn’t stand on any firmer ground when he moves from conclusions to recommendations. He has often claimed that 50 billion tons is the maximum weight of global resource extraction that Earth can sustainably handle and that we’re already well past this limit. In the face of this alleged crisis, he maintains that “the only fail-safe strategy is to impose legally binding caps on resource use and gradually ratchet it back down to safe levels.” However, the paper he cites to support his views contains a frank admission: “There is still no hard scientific evidence of causal relationship between human-induced resource flows and the possible breakdown of life-supporting functions at continental or global scale from which … targets [like a 50 billion ton limit] could directly be derived.” Before taking the unprecedented step of setting up a central resource planning bureaucracy, it doesn’t seem like too much to ask for hard scientific evidence that it’s actually necessary.

Let’s Keep Climbing

Throughout our history, we humans have been climbing a difficult path toward longer, healthier, more prosperous lives. As we climbed that path, we turned the environment around it brown and gray. Our mania for growth was in many ways bad news for the planet we all live on.

Recently, however, we have figured out how to make our path a green one, how to continue to grow while reducing our impact on Earth. The world’s richest countries are also putting more land and water under conservation, reintroducing native species into ecosystems from which they had been hunted into oblivion, and improving Earth in many other ways.

For reasons that I don't understand well, and that I understand less the more evidence I look at, degrowthers want to make us turn around and start walking back down the path, away from higher prosperity. Their vision seems to be one of a centrally planned, ever-deepening recession throughout the rich world for the sake of the environment.

Thanks to Covid-19, we have an inkling of how this would feel. A “degrowth recession” wouldn't have the virus’ deaths and sickness, and it wouldn't require us to practice social distancing. But it would have all the economic contractions’ job losses, business closures, mortgage defaults, and other hardships and uncertainties. And it would have them without end—after all, growth can't be allowed to restart. Corporate and government revenue would decrease permanently, and therefore so would innovation and R&D.

How many of us would be willing to accept all of this in exchange for somewhat less pollution and resource use? To sharpen the question, how many of us would be willing to accept this recession if it wasn’t necessary—if it were clear that we could get environmental improvements while continuing to grow and prosper?

The ecomodernist argument is that that is in fact clear. Unlike the degrowth argument, it's supported by a great deal of evidence. What's at least important is that it will be supported by a great deal of the world's people, who will eagerly sign up to climb our new green path to prosperity.

#### It’s key to CCS – link-turns every impact.

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GC: Green capitalism is a new economic system that values the natural resources on which human survival depends. It fosters a harmonious relationship with our planet, its resources and the many species it harbors. It is a new type of market economics that addresses both equity and efficiency. Using carbon negative technology™ it helps reduce carbon in the atmosphere while fostering economic development in rich and developing nations, for example in the U S., EU, China and India. How does this work? In a nutshell Green Capitalism requires the creation of global limits or property rights nation by nation for the use of the atmosphere, the bodies of water and the planet’s biodiversity, and the creation of new markets to trade these rights from which new economic values and a new concept of economic progress emerges updating GDP as is now generally agreed is needed. Green Capitalism is needed now to help avert climate change and achieve the goals of the 2015 UN Paris Agreement, which are very ambitious and universally supported but have no way to be realized within the Agreement itself. The Carbon Market and its CDM play critical roles in the foundation of Green Capitalism, creating values to redefine GDP. These are needed to remain within the world’s “CO2 budget” and avoid catastrophic climate change. As I see it, the building blocks for Green Capitalism are then as follows; (1) Global limits nation by nation in the use of the planet’s atmosphere, its water bodies and biodiversity - these are global public goods. (2) New global markets to trade these limits, based on equity and efficiency. These markets are relatives of the Carbon Market and the SO2 market. The new market create new measures of economic values and update the concept of GDP. (3) Efficient use of Carbon Negative Technologies to avert catastrophic climate change by providing a smooth transition to clean energy and ensuring economic prosperity in rich and poor nations. These building blocks have immediate practical implications in reversing climate change and can assist the ambitious aims of Paris COP21 become a reality. MR: What is the greatest advantage of the new generation technologies that can capture CO2 from the air? GC: These technologies build carbon negative power plants, such as Global Thermostat, that clean the atmosphere of CO2 while producing electricity. Global Thermostat is a firm that is commercializing a technology that takes CO2 out of air and uses mostly low cost residual heat rather than electricity to drive the capture process, making the entire process of capturing CO2 from the atmosphere very inexpensive. There is enough residua heat in a coal power plant that it can be used to capture twice as much CO2 as the plant emits, thus transforming the power plant into a “carbon sink.” For example, a 400 MW coal plant that emits 1 million tons of CO2 per year can become a carbon sink absorbing a net amount of 1 million tons of CO2 instead. Carbon capture from air can be done anywhere and at any time, and so inexpensively that the CO2 can be sold for industrial or commercial uses such as plastics, food and beverages, greenhouses, bio-fertilizers, building materials and even enhanced oil recovery, all examples of large global markets and profitable opportunities. Carbon capture is powered mostly by low (85°C) residual heat that is inexpensive, and any source will do. In particular, renewable (solar) technology can power the process of carbon capture. This can help advance solar technology and make it more cost-efficient. This means more energy, more jobs, and it also means economic growth in developing nations, all of this while cleaning the CO2 in the atmosphere. Carbon negative technologies can literally transform the world economy. MR: One final question. You distinguish between long-run and short-run strategies in the effort to reverse climate change. Would carbon negative technologies be part of a short-run strategy? GC: Long-run strategies are quite different from strategies for the short-run. Often long-run strategies do not work in the short run and different policies and economic incentives are needed. In the long run the best climate change policy is to replace fossil fuel sources of energy that by themselves cause 45% of the global emissions, and to plant trees to restore if possible the natural sources and sinks of CO2. But the fossil fuel power plant infrastructure is about 87% of the power plant infrastructure and about $45-55 trillion globally. This infrastructure cannot be replaced quickly, certainly not in the short time period in which we need to take action to avert catastrophic climate change. The issue is that CO2 once emitted remains hundreds of years in the atmosphere and we have emitted so much that unless we actually remove the CO2 that is already there, we cannot remain long within the carbon budget, which is the concentration of CO2 beyond which we fear catastrophic climate change. In the short run, therefore, we face significant time pressure. The IPCC indicates in its 2014 5th Assessment Report that we must actually remove the carbon that is already in the atmosphere and do so in massive quantities, this century (p. 191 of 5th Assessment Report). This is what I called a carbon negative approach, which works for the short run. Renewable energy is the long run solution. Renewable energy is too slow for a short run resolution since replacing a $45-55 trillion power plant infrastructure with renewable plants could take decades. We need action sooner than that. For the short run we need carbon negative technologies that capture more carbon than what is emitted. Trees do that and they must be conserved to help preserve biodiversity. Biochar does that. But trees and other natural sinks are too slow for what we need today. Therefore, negative carbon is needed now as part of a blueprint for transformation. It must be part of the blueprint for Sustainable Development and its short term manifestation that I call Green Capitalism, while in the long run renewable sources of energy suffice, including Wind, Biofuels, Nuclear, Geothermal, and Hydroelectric energy. These are in limited supply and cannot replace fossil fuels. Global energy today is roughly divided as follows: 87% is fossil, namely natural gas, coal, oil; 10% is nuclear, geothermal, and hydroelectric, and less than 1% is solar power — photovoltaic and solar thermal. Nuclear fuel is scarce and nuclear technology is generally considered dangerous as tragically experienced by the Fukushima Daichi nuclear disaster in Japan, and it seems unrealistic to seek a solution in the nuclear direction. Only solar energy can be a long term solution: Less than 1% of the solar energy we receive on earth can be transformed into 10 times the fossil fuel energy used in the world today. Yet we need a short-term strategy that accelerates long run renewable energy, or we will defeat long-term goals. In the short term as the IPCC validates, we need carbon negative technology, carbon removals. The short run is the next 20 or 30 years. There is no time in this period of time to transform the entire fossil infrastructure — it costs $45-55 trillion (IEA) to replace and it is slow to build. We need to directly reduce carbon in the atmosphere now. We cannot use traditional methods to remove CO2 from smokestacks (called often Carbon Capture and Sequestration, CSS) because they are not carbon negative as is required. CSS works but does not suffice because it only captures what power plants currently emit. Any level of emissions adds to the stable and high concentration we have today and CO2 remains in the atmosphere for years. We need to remove the CO2 that is already in the atmosphere, namely air capture of CO2 also called carbon removals. The solution is to combine air capture of CO2 with storage of CO2 into stable materials such as biochar, cement, polymers, and carbon fibers that replace a number of other construction materials such as metals. The most recent BMW automobile model uses only carbon fibers rather than metals. It is also possible to combine CO2 to produce renewable gasoline, namely gasoline produced from air and water. CO2 can be separated from air and hydrogen separated from water, and their combination is a well-known industrial process to produce gasoline. Is this therefore too expensive? There are new technologies using algae that make synthetic fuel commercially feasible at competitive rates. Other policies would involve combining air capture with solar thermal electricity using the residual solar thermal heat to drive the carbon capture process. This can make a solar plant more productive and efficient so it can out-compete coal as a source of energy. In summary, the blueprint offered here is a private/public approach, based on new industrial technology and financial markets, self-funded and using profitable greenmarkets, with securities that utilize carbon credits as the “underlying” asset, based on the KP CDM, as well as new markets for biodiversity and water providing abundant clean energy to stave off impending and actual energy crisis in developing nations, fostering mutually beneficial cooperation for industrial and developing nations. The blueprint proposed provides the two sides of the coin, equity and efficiency, and can assign a critical role for women as stewards for human survival and sustainable development. My vision is a carbon negative economy that represents green capitalism in resolving the Global Climate negotiations and the North–South Divide. Carbon negative power plants and capture of CO2 from air and ensure a clean atmosphere together innovation and more jobs and exports: the more you produce and create jobs the cleaner becomes the atmosphere. In practice, Green Capitalism means economic growth that is harmonious with the Earth resources.

#### IEA studies and empirics prove that universal decoupling is occuring --- global emissions have stalled for years despite consistent growth

**Riti** et. al **17** [Joshua Sunday Riti, School of Economics, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Department of Economics, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Jos, “Decoupling CO2 emission and economic growth in China: Is there consistency in estimation results in analyzing environmental Kuznets curve?”, Journal of Cleaner Production Volume 166, 10 November 2017, Pages 1448-1461, Science Direct]

According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), universal carbon dioxide-greenhouse gas related emissions shows some stability in 2015 at approximately 32.1 Gt for the second year in a row, validating the decoupling of global greenhouse gas emissions and economic growth (Enerdata, 2015; Itskos et al., 2016). The stalling of global emissions is no surprise, as this is in line with the slowing trend in annual emission growth over the past three years, starting from 2.0% in 2013 to 1.1% in 2014 and further down to 0.1% in 2015. A similar trend of declining growth in global emissions could also be seen from 2010 to 2012, starting from 5.7% down to 0.7%. It is debatable whether the plateaued emission level will continue and results from structural changes (Jackson et al., 2016; Qi et al., 2016; Green and Stern, 2016). In 2009, a stronger global downward trend of 1.0% was recorded, compared to 2008 levels, but this was due to the global economic downturn. Stalling in emissions is not coupled with the GDP trend, as global GDP kept up with an annual growth of 3.0% in 2015 compared to 2014. A more structural change with a shift away from carbon-intensive activities, particularly in China but also in the United States, contributed considerably to this trend. This achievement was made possible through the global investment in energy efficiency which increased by 6% in 2015 (IEA, 2010) and the rise in the proportion of renewables in the generation of power. It is estimated that the share of renewables was around 90 percent of the latest power generation in year 2015, with power from wind alone responsible for over 50 percent.

#### It’s sustainable and solves poverty and every quality of life metric.

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Since the early 1990s, daily life in poor countries has been changing profoundly for the better: **one billion people** have escaped extreme poverty, average **incomes have doubled**, infant death **rates have plummeted**, millions more girls have enrolled in school, **chronic hunger** has been cut almost in half, deaths from malaria and other diseases have declined dramatically, **democracy has spread** far and wide, and the incidence of war—even with Syria and other conflicts—has fallen by half. This unprecedented progress goes way beyond China and India and has touched hundreds of millions of people in dozens of developing countries across the globe, from Mongolia to Mozambique, Bangladesh to Brazil. Yet few people are aware of these achievements, even though, in aggregate, they rank among the **most important in human history**. In 2013, the Swedish survey organization Novus Group International asked Americans how they thought the share of the world’s population living in extreme poverty had changed over the last two decades. Sixty-six percent of respondents said that they thought it had doubled, and another 29 percent said that it hadn’t changed. Only five percent knew (or guessed) the truth: that the share of people living in extreme **poverty had fallen by half**. Perhaps that ignorance explains why Washington has done so little to take advantage of these promising trends, giving only tepid support to nascent democracies, making limited investments in economic development and in new health and agricultural technologies, and failing to take the lead in building more **effective international institutions**. Whatever the reason, many developing countries are now responding to what they perceive as the United States’ indifference by looking elsewhere—especially toward China—for deeper engagement and advice on how to keep growing. At the same time, climate change, the slowdown in global growth, and rising tensions in the Middle East and beyond have begun to **threaten further progress**. As a result, the United States now risks missing out on a **historic chance** to strengthen its global leadership and help create a safer, more prosperous, and more democratic world—just at the moment when it could help the most. ONE GIANT LEAP Global poverty is falling faster today than at any time in human history. In 1993, about two billion people were trapped in extreme poverty (defined by the World Bank as living on less than $1.90 per day); by 2012, that number had dropped to less than one billion. The industrialization of China is a big part of the story, of course, but even excluding that country, the number of extreme poor has fallen by more than 400 million. Since the 1980s, **more than 60 countries** have reduced the number of their citizens who are impoverished, even as their overall populations have grown. This decline in poverty has gone hand in hand with much **faster economic growth**. Between 1977 and 1994, the growth in per capita GDP across the developing countries averaged zero; since 1995, that figure has shot up to three percent. Again, the change is widespread: between 1977 and 1994, only 21 developing countries (out of 109 with populations greater than one million) exceeded two percent annual per capita growth, but between 1995 and 2013, 71 such countries did so. And going backward has become much less common: in the earlier period, more than 50 developing countries recorded negative growth, but in the later one, just ten did. The **improvements in health** have been even bigger. In 1960, 22 percent of children in developing countries died before their fifth birthday, but by 2013, only five percent did. Diarrhea killed five million children a year in 1990 but claimed fewer than one million in 2014. **Half as many people** now **die** from malaria as did in 2000, and deaths from tuberculosis and AIDS have both dropped by a third. The share of people living with chronic hunger has fallen by almost half since the mid-1990s. **Life expectancy** at birth in developing countries has **lengthened by** nearly **one-third**, from 50 years in 1960 to 65 years today. These improvements in health have left no country untouched, even the worst-governed ones. Consider this: the rate of child death has declined in every single country (at least those where data are available) since 1980. Meanwhile, far more children are enrolling in and completing school. In the late 1980s, only 72 percent of all primary-school-age children attended school; now, the figure exceeds 87 percent. Girls in developing countries have enjoyed the biggest gains. In 1980, only half of them finished primary school, whereas four out of five do so today. These leaps in education are beginning to translate into better-skilled workers. Then there is the shift to democracy. Prior to the 1980s, most developing countries were run by left- or right-wing dictators. Coups and countercoups, violence and assassinations, human rights abuses—all formed part of regular political life. But starting in the 1980s, dictators began to fall, a process that accelerated after the Cold War. In 1983, only 17 of 109 developing countries qualified as democracies, based on data from Freedom House and the Center for Systemic Peace; by 2013, the number had **more than tripled**, to 56 (and that’s not counting the many more developing countries with populations of less than one million). As those numbers suggest, power today is far more likely to be transferred through the ballot box than through violence, and elections in most countries have become fairer and more transparent. Twenty years ago, few Indonesians could have imagined that a furniture maker from central Java would beat one of Suharto’s relatives in a free and fair election, as Joko Widodo did in 2014. Nor would many have predicted that Nigeria, then still under military rule, would in 2015 mark its first peaceful transfer of power between parties, or that Myanmar (also called Burma) would hold its most successful democratic election the same year. Across the developing world, individual freedoms and rights are honored to a much greater degree, human rights **abuses are rarer**, and legislative bodies have more power. Yes, many of these new democracies have problems. And yes, the march toward democracy has slowed since 2005—and even reversed in some countries, such as Thailand and Venezuela. But in many more—from Brazil to Mongolia to Senegal—democracy has deepened. Never before in history have so many **developing countries been so democratic**. As states have become wealthier and more democratic, **conflict and violence** within them have declined. Those who think otherwise should remember that as recently as the 1980s and early 1990s, much of the world was aflame, from Central America to Southeast Asia to West Africa. There were half as many civil wars in the last decade as there were in the 1980s, and the number of people killed in armed conflicts has **fallen by three-quarters**. Three major forces sparked this great surge in development progress. First, the end of the Cold War brought an end to the superpowers’ support for some of the world’s nastiest dictators and reduced the frequency of conflict. As ideas about economic and political governance began to change, developing countries introduced more market-based economic systems and more democracy. Second, globalization created vast new opportunities for economic growth. Increased flows of trade, investment, information, and technology created more jobs and improved living standards. Third, new and more effective leaders—in politics, business, religion, and civil society—began to forge deep change. Where courageous figures, such as Nelson Mandela in South Africa, stepped forward, countries progressed; where old-style dictators, such as Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe, remained in power, countries languished. This **incredibly wide-ranging progress** should not obscure the considerable work that remains: progress has not reached everyone, everywhere. One billion people still live in extreme poverty, six million children die every year from preventable diseases, too few girls get the education they deserve, and too many people suffer under dictatorships. Countries such as Haiti, North Korea, Uzbekistan, and Zimbabwe lag far behind. But the fact remains that an **enormous transformation** is under way—one that has already substantially improved the lives of hundreds of millions of people. WIN-WIN The United States should welcome and encourage this progress. For starters, broad-based development **enhances global security**. It is not true that poverty necessarily breeds terrorism, as some argue—after all, most poor people are not terrorists, and many terrorists are not poor. But it is true that poor states tend to be weak states unable to prevent **terrorist and criminal networks** from operating on their soil. Sustained development strengthens government institutions and reduces the need for outside intervention. As former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates put it, “Development is a lot cheaper than sending soldiers.” Development also builds states’ capacities to fight pandemic disease. Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone were overwhelmed by Ebola in 2014 largely because they all had weak health systems. The same was true in many of the countries hit hardest by the HIV/AIDS epidemic decades ago. As poor countries grow wealthier, however, they become better equipped to **fight diseases** that can spread quickly beyond their borders. A more prosperous developing world also benefits the U.S. economy. The spread of economic growth creates **new markets** for American businesses not just in China but also in Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa, and beyond. Developing countries are buying more and more aircraft, automobiles, semiconductors, medical equipment, pharmaceuticals, consultancy services, and entertainment. Although the growth in trade with developing countries has slowed during the last year, their economies will no doubt remain major market opportunities for U.S. companies. In 1990, such states accounted for one-third of the global economy; today, their share is half, and they purchase more than half of U.S. exports. In 2011, Walmart spent $2.4 billion to acquire a controlling share of a holding company that operates more than 350 retail stores in South Africa and 11 other African countries, signaling a level of interest in African consumers that would have been unimaginable two decades ago. To be sure, emerging markets also create competition for U.S. businesses and hardship for American workers who lose their jobs as a result. But they also create many new jobs, as American firms expand abroad and as companies in the developing world send more capital to the West. Moreover, developing countries are increasingly coming up with their own **innovations** and **technologies**, in medicine, agriculture, energy, and more. The United States should respond to this growing competition not with protectionism but by strengthening its own capacities: rebuilding its **infrastructure, improving** its **educational** system, and investing in new technologies. Finally, development helps spread and deepen the values that Americans hold dear: openness, economic opportunity, democracy, and freedom. These values tend to go hand in hand with growing prosperity: as incomes rise, citizens demand greater freedoms. History suggests that even governments that do not welcome these ideas eventually embrace them or are replaced by those that do. And as more developing countries achieve progress under market-based economic systems and democracy, other countries seek to **emulate the model**. The United States and Europe have a strong self-interest in encouraging this process, since it will enhance global stability and add to the number of like-minded partners that can help address future challenges. SUSTAINING THE SURGE What makes all this progress especially impressive is that it has continued despite a number of major shocks that in an earlier age could well have stopped it: the outbreak of the HIV/AIDS pandemic in the 1980s, the Asian financial crisis in 1997–98, the 9/11 attacks, the global food crisis of 2007–8, and the global financial crisis of 2008. In each case, pundits predicted that the disaster of the day would set back progress. Yet in each case, the gains continued. There are good reasons to believe they can continue well into the future. The forces that sparked these **changes were fundamental**, not transitory. Governments have learned from their mistakes and gotten much better at managing inevitable downturns. Global integration has made critical technologies available to more and more people. **State institutions** have become more effective, with improved (if imperfect) legal systems, clearer property rights, and greater respect for individual liberties. Democratic rules and norms governing the transfer of political power, free speech, and accountability have become more deeply entrenched. Civil society groups are more active. These deep-seated changes have put enormous additional gains well within reach. If **economic growth proceeds** along the lines of most projections over the next two decades, some 700 million more people will escape extreme poverty. Per capita incomes in poor countries will double again, **millions of** childhood **deaths** will be avoided, **tens of millions** of children will get the education they deserve, hunger will decline, and basic rights and freedoms will spread further. At least, that’s what should happen—but none of these future gains is guaranteed. Growth has slowed markedly since 2008 in emerging economies such as Brazil and China and throughout the developing world. Russia, Thailand, and Venezuela have turned less democratic, and South Africa and Turkey seem to be headed in that direction as well. The Middle East has seen the return of conflict and **authoritarian rule**. China’s aggressive actions in the South China Sea could **spark a major conflict** that could kill tens of thousands of people and devastate the region’s economies. Outbreaks of SARS and the H1N1 and Ebola viruses underscore humanity’s vulnerability to disease, and many doctors worry that growing resistance to antibiotics could reverse some of the hard-fought gains in health. Meanwhile, global population is on track to exceed nine billion by 2050, and the combination of more people, higher incomes, and warmer climates will place enormous strains on the world’s supplies of fresh water, food, and energy. Although there are ample grounds for pessimism, the doomsayers continue to **underestimate humanity’s growing ability** to cooperate in the face of new challenges. In the eighteenth century, when Thomas Malthus looked at population growth and foresaw catastrophic famine, he failed to appreciate the advances in agriculture, health, and governance that human ingenuity could create. The same was true for those that predicted a population disaster in Asia in the 1960s and 1970s. Today, the problems facing developing countries are plain to see, while the new ideas and innovations that will overcome them are harder to picture. Continued progress isn’t automatic or guaranteed. But with smart choices, it is within reach. LEADING BY EXAMPLE Most of the key choices will be made in developing countries themselves. Sustaining progress will require leaders there to reduce their countries’ dependence on natural resources, make their economies more inclusive, invest more in health and education, expand opportunities for women, and strengthen democracy and the rule of law. Yet the future of development will also **depend on the** actions of the **world’s leading countries**, since poorer countries can prosper only in a strong global system. The United States must do its part by regaining its economic leadership through major investments in infrastructure, education, and technological advances in health, agriculture, and alternative fuels. It must act to fix its long-term budget problems by improving the solvency of Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid and strengthen the financial system through better regulation. The country must also do a much better job of leading by **example on democracy**. Deep political polarization, the lack of substantive debate, the unwillingness to compromise, misguided foreign policy adventurism, and the Great Recession have made liberal democracy look unattractive and ineffective. That malaise matters, because many developing countries are now engaged in a battle of ideas over which economic and political model they should follow. On the one side stands the model that has prevailed in the West since World War II: market capitalism coupled with **liberal democracy**. On the other is the model practiced by China, Vietnam, Ethiopia, and, increasingly, Russia, among others: state capitalism coupled with authoritarian rule. And there’s yet one more option, with a smaller but more dangerous following: religious fundamentalism, as promulgated by Iran and Saudi Arabia and groups such as the Islamic State (or ISIS) and Boko Haram in Nigeria. As the Western countries struggle and China continues to rise, authoritarian capitalism is becoming more appealing. Consider Beijing’s ties to Africa. China purchased $26 billion in imports from the continent in 2013; the United States purchased $9 billion. Chinese investment in Africa has been growing by 50 percent per year since 2000, whereas U.S. investment is growing by 14 percent per year. Make no mistake: many Africans still prefer to follow the American model and view China with suspicion. But those attitudes are beginning to shift, and Beijing’s apparent ability to get things done will only enhance China’s appeal, especially if Washington seems to talk big but deliver little. THE NEXT SURGE FORWARD Aside from the broader task of getting their own houses in order, the United States and other Western powers should also assert leadership in several specific areas to **keep the progress going**. The first is climate change, which presents one of the greatest threats to poverty reduction. Most of the world’s poor countries had little to do with creating the problem, yet they will bear the brunt of the damage. Rising sea levels, changing rainfall patterns, higher temperatures, and dwindling water supplies will derail progress, will undermine global food production, and could engender major conflict. Developing countries have an important role to play in curbing emissions, but they will not switch to low-carbon fuels and other clean technologies if their developed-world counterparts do not. Washington has taken important first steps to reduce power-plant emissions and raise automotive fuel-efficiency standards, but there is a very long way to go. Second, leading countries—especially the United States—should invest more in **technological innovation**. Much of the credit for recent improvements in living standards goes to vaccines, medicines, high-yielding seed varieties, cell phones, and the Internet. These new technologies (alongside old ones such as electricity and paved roads) have not yet reached everywhere, so simply making them more widely available would do wonders. But sustaining progress for the next several decades will also require **significant investments** in new vaccines, more powerful drugs, drought- and heat-resistant seeds, desalination techniques, and clean energy.

#### Cap solves war.

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Countries with liberal political and economic systems rarely use military force against each other. This anomalous peace has been most prominently attributed to the ‘democratic peace’ – the apparent tendency for democratic countries to avoid militarized conflict with each other (Maoz & Russett, 1993; Ray, 1995; Dafoe, Oneal & Russett, 2013). More recently, however, scholars have proposed that the liberal peace could be partly (Russett & Oneal, 2001) or primarily (Gartzke, 2007; but see Dafoe, 2011) attributed to liberal economic factors, such as commercial and financial interdependence. In particular, Erik Gartzke, Quan Li & Charles Boehmer (2001), henceforth referred to as GLB, have demonstrated that measures of capital openness have a substantial and statistically significant association with peaceful dyadic relations. Gartzke (2007) confirms that this association is robust to a large variety of model specifications.

To explain this correlation, GLB propose that countries with open capital markets are more able to credibly signal their resolve through the bearing of greater economic costs prior to the outbreak of militarized conflict. This explanation is novel and plausible, and resonates with the rationalist view of asymmetric information as a cause of conflict (Fearon, 1995). Moreover, it implies clear testable predictions on evidential domains different from those examined by GLB.

In this article we exploit this opportunity by constructing a confirmatory test of GLB’s theory of market-mediated signaling. We first develop an innovative quantitative case selection technique to identify crucial cases where the mechanism of market-mediated signaling should be most easily observed. Specifically, we employ quantitative data and the statistical models used to support the theory we are probing to create an impartial and transparentmeans of selecting cases in which the theory – as specified by the theory’s creators –makes its most confident predictions. We implement three different case selection rules to select cases that optimize on two criteria: (1) maximizing the inferential leverage of our cases, and (2) minimizing selection bias.

We examine these cases for a necessary implication of market-mediated signaling: that key participants drew a connection between conflictual events and adverse market movements. Such an inference is a necessary step in the process by which market-mediated costs can signal resolve. For evidence of this we examine news media, government documents, memoirs, historical works, and other sources. We additionally examine other sources, such as market data, for evidence that economic costs were caused by escalatory events. Based on this analysis, we assess the evidence for GLB’s theory of market mediated costly signaling.

Our article then considers a more complex heterogeneous effects version of market-mediated signaling in which unspecified scope conditions are required for the mechanism to operate. Our design has the feature of selecting cases in which scope conditions are most likely to be absent. This allows us to perform an exploratory analysis of these cases, looking for possible scope conditions. We also consider alternative potential mechanisms. Our cases are reviewed in more detail in the online appendix.1

To summarize our results, our confirmatory test finds that while market-mediated signaling may be operative in the most serious disputes, it was largely absent in the less serious disputes that characterize most of the sample of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs). This suggests either that other mechanisms account for the correlation between capital openness and peace, or that the scope conditions for market-mediated signaling are restrictive. Of the signals that we observed, strategic market-mediated signals were relatively more important than automatic market-mediated signals in the most serious conflicts. We identify a number of potential scope conditions, such as that (1) the conflict must be driven by bargaining failure arising from uncertainty and (2) the economic costs need to escalate gradually and need to be substantial, but less than the expected military costs of conflict.

Finally, there were a number of other explanations that seemed present in the cases we examined and could account for the capitalist peace: capital openness is associated with greater anticipated economic costs of conflict; capital openness leads third parties to have a greater stake in the conflict and therefore be more willing to intervene; a dyadic acceptance of the status quo could promote both peace and capital openness; and countries seeking to institutionalize a regional peace might instrumentally harness the pacifying effects of liberal markets.

The correlation: Open capital markets and peace

The empirical puzzle at the core of this article is the significant and robust correlation noted by GLB between high levels of capital openness in both members of a dyad and the infrequent incidence of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) and wars between the members of this dyad (Gartzke, Li & Boehmer, 2001). The index of capital openness (CAPOPEN) is intended to capture the ‘difficulty states face in seeking to impose restrictions on capital flows (the degree of lost policy autonomy due to globalization)’ (Gartzke & Li, 2003: 575). CAPOPEN is constructed from data drawn from the widely used IMF’s Annual Reports on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Controls; it is a combination of eight binary variables that measure different types of government restrictions on capital and currency flow (Gartzke, Li & Boehmer, 2001: 407). The measure of CAPOPEN starts in 1966 and is defined for many countries (increasingly more over time). Most of the countries that do not have a measure of CAPOPEN are communist.2

GLB implement this variable in a dyadic framework by creating a new variable, CAPOPENL, which is the smaller of the two dyadic values of CAPOPEN. This operationalization is sometimes referred to as the ‘weak-link’ specification since the functional form is consonant with a model of war in which the ‘weakest link’ in a dyad determines the probability of war. CAPOPENL has a negative monotonic association with the incidence of MIDs, fatal MIDs, and wars (see Figure 1).3 The strength of the estimated empirical association between peace and CAPOPENL, using a modified version of the dataset and model from Gartzke (2007), is comparable to that between peace and, respectively, joint democracy, log of distance, or the GDP of a contiguous dyad (Gartzke, 2007: 179; Gartzke, Li & Boehmer, 2001: 412). In summary, CAPOPENL seems to be an important and robust correlate of peace. The question of why specifically this correlation exists, however, remains to be answered.

The mechanism: Market-mediated signaling?

Gartzke, Li & Boehmer (2001) argue that the classic liberal account for the pacific effect of economic interdependence – that interdependence increases the expected costs of war – is not consistent with the bargaining theory of war (see also Morrow, 1999). GLB argue that ‘conventional descriptions of interdependence see war as less likely because states face additional opportunity costs for fighting. The problem with such an account is that it ignores incentives to capitalize on an opponent’s reticence to fight’ (Gartzke, Li & Boehmer, 2001: 400.)4 Instead, GLB (see also Gartzke, 2003; Gartzke & Li, 2003) argue that financial interdependence could promote peace by facilitating the sending of costly signals. As the probability of militarized conflict increases, states incur a variety of automatic and strategically imposed economic costs as a consequence of escalation toward conflict. Those states that persist in a dispute despite these costs will reveal their willingness to tolerate them, and hence signal resolve. The greater the degree of economic interdependence, the more a resolved country could demonstrate its willingness to suffer costs ex ante to militarized conflict.

Gartzke, Li & Boehmer’s mechanism implies a commonly perceived costly signal before militarized conflict breaks out or escalates: if market-mediated signaling is to account for the correlation between CAPOPENL and the absence of MIDs, then visible market-mediated costs should occur prior to or during periods of real or potential conflict (Gartzke, Li & Boehmer, 2001). Thus, the proposed mechanism should leave many visible footprints in the historical record. This theory predicts that these visible signals must arise in any escalating conflict, involving countries with high capital openness, in which this mechanism is operative

Clarifying the signaling mechanism

Gartzke, Li & Boehmer’s signaling mechanism is mostly conceptualized on an abstract, game-theoretic level (Gartzke, Li & Boehmer, 2001). In order to elucidate the types of observations that could inform this theory’s validity, we discuss with greater specificity the possible ways in which such signaling might occur.

A conceptual classification of costly signals

The term signaling connotes an intentional communicative act by one party directed towards another. Because the term signaling thus suggests a willful act, and a signal of resolve is only credible if it is costly, scholars have sometimes concluded that states involved in bargaining under incomplete information could advance their interests by imposing costs on themselves and thereby signaling their resolve (e.g. Lektzian & Sprecher, 2007).

However, the game-theoretic concept of signaling refers more generally to any situation in which an actor’s behavior reveals information about her private information. In fact, states frequently adopt sanctions with low costs to themselves and high costs to their rivals because doing so is often a rational bargaining tactic on other grounds: they are trying to coerce their rival to concede the issue. Bargaining encounters of this type can be conceptualized as a type of war-of-attrition game in which each actor attempts to coerce the other through the imposition of escalating costs. Such encounters also provide the opportunity for signaling: when states resist the costs imposed by their rivals, they ‘signal’ their resolve. If at some point one party perceives the conflict to have become too costly and steps back, that party ‘signals’ a lack of resolve. Thus, this kind of signaling arises as a by-product of another’s coercive attempts. In other words, costly signals come in two forms: self-inflicted (information about a leader arising from a leader’s intentional or incidental infliction of costs on himself) or imposed (information about a leader that arises from a leader’s response to a rival’s imposition of costs).

Additionally, costs may arise as an automatic byproduct of escalation towards military conflict or may be a tool of statecraft that is strategically employed during a conflict. The automatic mechanism stipulates that as the probability of conflict increases, various economic assets will lose value due to the risk of conflict and investor flight. However, the occurrence of these costs may also be intentional outcomes of specific escalatory decisions of the states, as in the case of deliberate sanctions; in this case they are strategic.

Finally, at a practical level, we identify three different potential kinds of economic costs of militarized conflict that may be mediated by open capital markets: capital costs from political risk, monetary coercion, and business sanctions. The most prominent mechanism proposed by Gartzke, Li & Boehmer (2001) to account for the correlation between capital openness and peace is that of capital costs. They note that 'since conflict threatens investments among disputing states, it makes such investments less desirable and capital becomes relatively scarce' (Gartzke, Li & Boehmer, 2001: 407) and hence more costly. Increased capital openness may increase the capital costs of escalation by increasing both the ease of capital flight (Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2003, 2007) and the expected harm of escalatory events to the national economy. This mechanism will be more effective in countries with more open capital markets; countries where the value of investments are more publicly observable (such as arises with a public stock exchange); and countries where leaders are more sensitive to the costs of capital.5

#### extinction outweighs – it’s the upmost moral evil and disavowal of the risk makes it more likely.

Burns 17 [Elizabeth Finneron-Burns is a Teaching Fellow at the University of Warwick and an Affiliated Researcher at the Institute for Futures Studies in Stockholm, What’s wrong with human extinction?, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00455091.2016.1278150?needAccess=true>, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2017]

Many, though certainly not all, people might believe that it would be wrong to bring about the end of the human species, and the reasons given for this belief are various. I begin by considering four reasons that could be given against the moral permissibility of human extinction. I will argue that only those reasons that impact the people who exist at the time that the extinction or the knowledge of the upcoming extinction occurs, can explain its wrongness. I use this conclusion to then consider in which cases human extinction would be morally permissible or impermissible, arguing that there is only a small class of cases in which it would not be wrong to cause the extinction of the human race or allow it to happen. 2.1. It would prevent the existence of very many happy people One reason of human extinction might be considered to be wrong lies in the value of human life itself. The thought here might be that it is a good thing for people to exist and enjoy happy lives and extinction would deprive more people of enjoying this good. The ‘good’ in this case could be understood in at least two ways. According to the first, one might believe that you benefit a person by bringing them into existence, or at least, that it is good for that person that they come to exist. The second view might hold that if humans were to go extinct, the utility foregone by the billions (or more) of people who could have lived but will now never get that opportunity, renders allowing human extinction to take place an incidence of wrongdoing. An example of this view can be found in two quotes from an Effective Altruism blog post by Peter Singer, Nick Beckstead and Matt Wage: One very bad thing about human extinction would be that billions of people would likely die painful deaths. But in our view, this is by far not the worst thing about human extinction. The worst thing about human extinction is that there would be no future generations. Since there could be so many generations in our future, the value of all those generations together greatly exceeds the value of the current generation. (Beckstead, Singer, and Wage 2013) The authors are making two claims. The first is that there is value in human life and also something valuable about creating future people which gives us a reason to do so; furthermore, it would be a very bad thing if we did not do so. The second is that, not only would it be a bad thing for there to be no future people, but it would actually be the worst thing about extinction. Since happy human lives have value, and the number of potential people who could ever exist is far greater than the number of people who exist at any one time, even if the extinction were brought about through the painful deaths of currently existing people, the former’s loss would be greater than the latter’s. Both claims are assuming that there is an intrinsic value in the existence of potential human life. The second claim makes the further assumption that the forgone value of the potential lives that could be lived is greater than the disvalue that would be accrued by people existing at the time of the extinction through suffering from painful and/or premature deaths. The best-known author of the post, Peter Singer is a prominent utilitarian, so it is not surprising that he would lament the potential lack of future human lives per se. However, it is not just utilitarians who share this view, even if implicitly. Indeed, other philosophers also seem to imply that they share the intuition that there is just something wrong with causing or failing to prevent the extinction of the human species such that we prevent more ‘people’ from having the ‘opportunity to exist’. Stephen Gardiner (2009) and Martin O’Neill (personal correspondence), both sympathetic to contract theory, for example, also find it intuitive that we should want more generations to have the opportunity to exist, assuming that they have worth-living lives, and I find it plausible to think that many other people (philosophers and non-philosophers alike) probably share this intuition. When we talk about future lives being ‘prevented’, we are saying that a possible person or a set of possible people who could potentially have existed will now never actually come to exist. To say that it is wrong to prevent people from existing could either mean that a possible person could reasonably reject a principle that permitted us not to create them, or that the foregone value of their lives provides a reason for rejecting any principle that permits extinction. To make the first claim we would have to argue that a possible person could reasonably reject any principle that prevented their existence on the grounds that it prevented them in particular from existing. However, this is implausible for two reasons. First, we can only wrong someone who did, does or will actually exist because wronging involves failing to take a person’s interests into account. When considering the permissibility of a principle allowing us not to create Person X, we cannot take X’s interest in being created into account because X will not exist if we follow the principle. By considering the standpoint of a person in our deliberations we consider the burdens they will have to bear as a result of the principle. In this case, there is no one who will bear any burdens since if the principle is followed (that is, if we do not create X), X will not exist to bear any burdens. So, only people who do/will actually exist can bear the brunt of a principle, and therefore occupy a standpoint that is owed justification. Second, existence is not an interest at all and a possible person is not disadvantaged by not being caused to exist. Rather than being an interest, it is a necessary requirement in order to have interests. Rivka Weinberg describes it as ‘neutral’ because causing a person to exist is to create a subject who can have interests; existence is not an interest itself.3 In order to be disadvantaged, there must be some detrimental effect on your interests. However, without existence, a person does not have any interests so they cannot be disadvantaged by being kept out of existence. But, as Weinberg points out, ‘never having interests itself could not be contrary to people’s interests since without interest bearers, there can be no ‘they’ for it to be bad for’ (Weinberg 2008, 13). So, a principle that results in some possible people never becoming actual does not impose any costs on those ‘people’ because nobody is disadvantaged by not coming into existence.4 It therefore seems that it cannot be wrong to fail to bring particular people into existence. This would mean that no one acts wrongly when they fail to create another person. Writ large, it would also not be wrong if everybody decided to exercise their prerogative not to create new people and potentially, by consequence, allow human extinction. One might respond here by saying that although it may be permissible for one person to fail to create a new person, it is not permissible if everyone chooses to do so because human lives have value and allowing human extinction would be to forgo a huge amount of value in the world. This takes us to the second way of understanding the potential wrongness of preventing people from existing — the foregone value of a life provides a reason for rejecting any principle that prevents it. One possible reply to this claim turns on the fact that many philosophers acknowledge that the only, or at least the best, way to think about the value of (individual or groups of) possible people’s lives is in impersonal terms (Parfit 1984; Reiman 2007; McMahan 2009). Jeff McMahan, for example, writes ‘at the time of one’s choice there is no one who exists or will exist independently of that choice for whose sake one could be acting in causing him or her to exist … it seems therefore that any reason to cause or not to cause an individual to exist … is best considered an impersonal rather than individual-affecting reason’ (McMahan 2009, 52). Another reply along similar lines would be to appeal to the value that is lost or at least foregone when we fail to bring into existence a next (or several next) generations of people with worth-living lives. Since ex hypothesi worth-living lives have positive value, it is better to create more such lives and worse to create fewer. Human extinction by definition is the creation of no future lives and would ‘deprive’ billions of ‘people’ of the opportunity to live worth-living lives. This might reduce the amount of value in the world at the time of the extinction (by killing already existing people), but it would also prevent a much vaster amount of value in the future (by failing to create more people). Both replies depend on the impersonal value of human life. However, recall that in contractualism impersonal values are not on their own grounds for reasonably rejecting principles. Scanlon himself says that although we have a strong reason not to destroy existing human lives, this reason ‘does not flow from the thought that it is a good thing for there to be more human life rather than less’ (104). In contractualism, something cannot be wrong unless there is an impact on a person. Thus, neither the impersonal value of creating a particular person nor the impersonal value of human life writ large could on its own provide a reason for rejecting a principle permitting human extinction. It seems therefore that the fact that extinction would deprive future people of the opportunity to live worth-living lives (either by failing to create either particular future people or future people in general) cannot provide us with a reason to consider human extinction to be wrong. Although the lost value of these ‘lives’ itself cannot be the reason explaining the wrongness of extinction, it is possible the knowledge of this loss might create a personal reason for some existing people. I will consider this possibility later on in section (d). But first I move to the second reason human extinction might be wrong per se. 2.2. It would mean the loss of the only known form of intelligent life and all civilization and intellectual progress would be lost A second reason we might think it would be wrong to cause human extinction is the loss that would occur of the only (known) form of rational life and the knowledge and civilization that that form of life has created. One thought here could be that just as some might consider it wrong to destroy an individual human heritage monument like the Sphinx, it would also be wrong if the advances made by humans over the past few millennia were lost or prevented from progressing. A related argument is made by those who feel that there is something special about humans’ capacity for rationality which is valuable in itself. Since humans are the only intelligent life that we know of, it would be a loss, in itself, to the world for that to end. I admit that I struggle to fully appreciate this thought. It seems to me that Henry Sidgwick was correct in thinking that these things are only important insofar as they are important to humans (Sidgwick 1874, I.IX.4).5 If there is no form of intelligent life in the future, who would there be to lament its loss since intelligent life is the only form of life capable of appreciating intelligence? Similarly, if there is no one with the rational capacity to appreciate historic monuments and civil progress, who would there be to be negatively affected or even notice the loss?6 However, even if there is nothing special about human rationality, just as some people try to prevent the extinction of nonhuman animal species, we might think that we ought also to prevent human extinction for the sake of biodiversity. The thought in this, as well as the earlier examples, must be that it would somehow be bad for the world if there were no more humans even though there would be no one for whom it is bad. This may be so but the only way to understand this reason is impersonally. Since we are concerned with wrongness rather than badness, we must ask whether something that impacts no one’s well-being, status or claims can be wrong. As we saw earlier, in the contractualist framework reasons must be personal rather than impersonal in order to provide grounds for reasonable rejection (Scanlon 1998, 218–223). Since the loss of civilization, intelligent life or biodiversity are per se impersonal reasons, there is no standpoint from which these reasons could be used to reasonably reject a principle that permitted extinction. Therefore, causing human extinction on the grounds of the loss of civilization, rational life or biodiversity would not be wrong. 2.3. Existing people would endure physical pain and/or painful and/or premature deaths Thinking about the ways in which human extinction might come about brings to the fore two more reasons it might be wrong. It could, for example, occur if all humans (or at least the critical number needed to be unable to replenish the population, leading to eventual extinction) underwent a sterilization procedure. Or perhaps it could come about due to anthropogenic climate change or a massive asteroid hitting the Earth and wiping out the species in the same way it did the dinosaurs millions of years ago. Each of these scenarios would involve significant physical and/or non-physical harms to existing people and their interests. Physically, people might suffer premature and possibly also painful deaths, for example. It is not hard to imagine examples in which the process of extinction could cause premature death. A nuclear winter that killed everyone or even just every woman under the age of 50 is a clear example of such a case. Obviously, some types of premature death themselves cannot be reasons to reject a principle. Every person dies eventually, sometimes earlier than the standard expected lifespan due to accidents or causes like spontaneously occurring incurable cancers. A cause such as disease is not a moral agent and therefore it cannot be wrong if it unavoidably kills a person prematurely. Scanlon says that the fact that a principle would reduce a person’s well-being gives that person a reason to reject the principle: ‘components of well-being figure prominently as grounds for reasonable rejection’ (Scanlon 1998, 214). However, it is not settled yet whether premature death is a setback to well-being. Some philosophers hold that death is a harm to the person who dies, whilst others argue that it is not.7 I will argue, however, that regardless of who is correct in that debate, being caused to die prematurely can be reason to reject a principle when it fails to show respect to the person as a rational agent. Scanlon says that recognizing others as rational beings with interests involves seeing reason to preserve life and prevent death: ‘appreciating the value of human life is primarily a matter of seeing human lives as something to be respected, where this involves seeing reasons not to destroy them, reasons to protect them, and reasons to want them to go well’ (Scanlon 1998, 104). The ‘respect for life’ in this case is a respect for the person living, not respect for human life in the abstract. This means that we can sometimes fail to protect human life without acting wrongfully if we still respect the person living. Scanlon gives the example of a person who faces a life of unending and extreme pain such that she wishes to end it by committing suicide. Scanlon does not think that the suicidal person shows a lack of respect for her own life by seeking to end it because the person whose life it is has no reason to want it to go on. This is important to note because it emphasizes the fact that the respect for human life is person-affecting. It is not wrong to murder because of the impersonal disvalue of death in general, but because taking someone’s life without their permission shows disrespect to that person. This supports its inclusion as a reason in the contractualist formula, regardless of what side ends up winning the ‘is death a harm?’ debate because even if death turns out not to harm the person who died, ending their life without their consent shows disrespect to that person. A person who could reject a principle permitting another to cause his or her premature death presumably does not wish to die at that time, or in that manner. Thus, if they are killed without their consent, their interests have not been taken into account, and they have a reason to reject the principle that allowed their premature death.8 This is as true in the case of death due to extinction as it is for death due to murder. However, physical pain may also be caused to existing people without killing them, but still resulting in human extinction. Imagine, for example, surgically removing everyone’s reproductive organs in order to prevent the creation of any future people. Another example could be a nuclear bomb that did not kill anyone, but did painfully render them infertile through illness or injury. These would be cases in which physical pain (through surgery or bombs) was inflicted on existing people and the extinction came about as a result of the painful incident rather than through death. Furthermore, one could imagine a situation in which a bomb (for example) killed enough people to cause extinction, but some people remained alive, but in terrible pain from injuries. It seems uncontroversial that the infliction of physical pain could be a reason to reject a principle. Although Scanlon says that an impact on well-being is not the only reason to reject principles, it plays a significant role, and indeed, most principles are likely to be rejected due to a negative impact on a person’s well-being, physical or otherwise. It may be queried here whether it is actually the involuntariness of the pain that is grounds for reasonable rejection rather than the physical pain itself because not all pain that a person suffers is involuntary. One can imagine acts that can cause physical pain that are not rejectable — base jumping or life-saving or improving surgery, for example. On the other hand, pushing someone off a cliff or cutting him with a scalpel against his will are clearly rejectable acts. The difference between the two cases is that in the former, the person having the pain inflicted has consented to that pain or risk of pain. My view is that they cannot be separated in these cases and it is involuntary physical pain that is the grounds for reasonable rejection. Thus, the fact that a principle would allow unwanted physical harm gives a person who would be subjected to that harm a reason to reject the principle. Of course the mere fact that a principle causes involuntary physical harm or premature death is not sufficient to declare that the principle is rejectable — there might be countervailing reasons. In the case of extinction, what countervailing reasons might be offered in favour of the involuntary physical pain/ death-inducing harm? One such reason that might be offered is that humans are a harm to the natural environment and that the world might be a better place if there were no humans in it. It could be that humans might rightfully be considered an all-things-considered hindrance to the world rather than a benefit to it given the fact that we have been largely responsible for the extinction of many species, pollution and, most recently, climate change which have all negatively affected the natural environment in ways we are only just beginning to understand. Thus, the fact that human extinction would improve the natural environment (or at least prevent it from degrading further), is a countervailing reason in favour of extinction to be weighed against the reasons held by humans who would experience physical pain or premature death. However, the good of the environment as described above is by definition not a personal reason. Just like the loss of rational life and civilization, therefore, it cannot be a reason on its own when determining what is wrong and countervail the strong personal reasons to avoid pain/death that is held by the people who would suffer from it.9 Every person existing at the time of the extinction would have a reason to reject that principle on the grounds of the physical pain they are being forced to endure against their will that could not be countervailed by impersonal considerations such as the negative impact humans may have on the earth. Therefore, a principle that permitted extinction to be accomplished in a way that caused involuntary physical pain or premature death could quite clearly be rejectable by existing people with no relevant countervailing reasons. This means that human extinction that came about in this way would be wrong. There are of course also additional reasons they could reject a similar principle which I now turn to address in the next section. 2.4. Existing people could endure non-physical harms I said earlier than the fact in itself that there would not be any future people is an impersonal reason and can therefore not be a reason to reject a principle permitting extinction. However, this impersonal reason could give rise to a personal reason that is admissible. So, the final important reason people might think that human extinction would be wrong is that there could be various deleterious psychological effects that would be endured by existing people having the knowledge that there would be no future generations. There are two main sources of this trauma, both arising from the knowledge that there will be no more people. The first relates to individual people and the undesired negative effect on well-being that would be experienced by those who would have wanted to have children. Whilst this is by no means universal, it is fair to say that a good proportion of people feel a strong pull towards reproduction and having their lineage continue in some way. Samuel Scheffler describes the pull towards reproduction as a ‘desire for a personalized relationship with the future’ (Scheffler 2012, 31). Reproducing is a widely held desire and the joys of parenthood are ones that many people wish to experience. For these people knowing that they would not have descendants (or that their descendants will endure painful and/or premature deaths) could create a sense of despair and pointlessness of life. Furthermore, the inability to reproduce and have your own children because of a principle/policy that prevents you (either through bans or physical interventions) would be a significant infringement of what we consider to be a basic right to control what happens to your body. For these reasons, knowing that you will have no descendants could cause significant psychological traumas or harms even if there were no associated physical harm. The second is a more general, higher level sense of hopelessness or despair that there will be no more humans and that your projects will end with you. Even those who did not feel a strong desire to procreate themselves might feel a sense of hopelessness that any projects or goals they have for the future would not be fulfilled. Many of the projects and goals we work towards during our lifetime are also at least partly future-oriented. Why bother continuing the search for a cure for cancer if either it will not be found within humans’ lifetime, and/or there will be no future people to benefit from it once it is found? Similar projects and goals that might lose their meaning when confronted with extinction include politics, artistic pursuits and even the type of philosophical work with which this paper is concerned. Even more extreme, through the words of the character Theo Faron, P.D. James says in his novel The Children of Men that ‘without the hope of posterity for our race if not for ourselves, without the assurance that we being dead yet live, all pleasures of the mind and senses sometimes seem to me no more than pathetic and crumbling defences shored up against our ruins’ (James 2006, 9). Even if James’ claim is a bit hyperbolic and all pleasures would not actually be lost, I agree with Scheffler in finding it not implausible that the knowledge that extinction was coming and that there would be no more people would have at least a general depressive effect on people’s motivation and confidence in the value of and joy in their activities (Scheffler 2012, 43). Both sources of psychological harm are personal reasons to reject a principle that permitted human extinction. Existing people could therefore reasonably reject the principle for either of these reasons. Psychological pain and the inability to pursue your personal projects, goals, and aims, are all acceptable reasons for rejecting principles in the contractualist framework. So too are infringements of rights and entitlements that we accept as important for people’s lives. These psychological reasons, then, are also valid reasons to reject principles that permitted or required human extinction.

#### Government action is key—reform can pursue genuine equality - defeatist attitudes ensure that the world stays the same and cede politics.

Eddie S. GLAUDE Jr., Professor of African American Studies and Religion at Princeton and a PhD in Religion from Princeton, 16 [*Democracy in Black: How Race Still Enslaves*, p. 185-197]

CHANGE HOW WE VIEW GOVERNMENT For more than three decades, we have been bludgeoned with an idea of government that has little to no concern for the public good. Big government is bad, we are told. It is inefficient, and its bloated bureaucracies are prone to corruption. Even Democrats, especially since Bill Clinton, have taken up this view. For example, Obama says, "We don't need big government; we need smart government." For some on the right, big government is bad because it aims to distribute wealth to those who are lazy and undeserving. "Big government" is just a shorthand for dreaded entitlement programs-all too often coded language for race. In this view, "big government" is the primary agent of enforcing racial equality, taking hard-earned stuff from white Americans and giving it to undeserving others. Government cannot do such a thing, they argue, without infringing on the rights of white Americans. And even government-mandated redistribution will not solve the problem. As Barry Goldwater put the point in 1964, "No matter how we try, we cannot pass a law that will make you like me or me like you. The key to racial and religious tolerance lies not in laws alone but, ultimately, in the hearts of men." From this perspective, government plays no role in changing our racial habits. Why would we want to make it bigger? But Goldwater failed to realize that governmental indifference can harden hearts, and government action can create conditions that soften them. People's attitudes aren't static or untouchable. They are molded by the quality of interactions with others, and one of the great powers of government involves shaping those interactions-not determining them in any concrete sense, but defining the parameters within which people come to know each other and live together. Today, for example, most Americans don't believe women should be confined to the home raising children, or subjected to crude advances and sexist remarks by men. The women's-rights movement put pressure on the government, which in turn passed laws that helped change some of our beliefs about women. Similarly, the relative progress of the 1960s did not happen merely by using the blunt instruments of the law. Change emerged from the ways those laws, with grassroots pressure, created new patterns of interactions, and ultimately new habits. Neither Obama's election to the presidency nor my appointment as a Princeton professor would have happened were it not for these new patterns and habits. None of this happens overnight. It takes time and increasing vigilance to protect and secure change. I was talking with a dose friend and he mentioned a basic fact: that we were only fifteen years removed from the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 when Ronald Reagan was elected president and Republicans began to dismantle the gains of the black freedom struggle. Civil rights legislation and the policies of the Great Society had just started to reshape our interactions when they started to be rolled back. We barely had a chance to imagine America anew-to pursue what full employment might look like, to let the abolition of the death penalty settle in, to question seriously the morality of putting people in prison cells, and to enact policies that would undo what the 1968 Kerner Commission described as "two Americas"­ before the attack on "big government" or, more precisely, the attack on racial equality was launched. The objective was to shrink the size of government ("to starve the beast") and to limit its domestic responsibilities to ensuring economic efficiency and national defense. Democrats eventually buckled, and this is the view of government, no matter who is in office, that we have today. It has become a kind of touchstone of faith among most Americans that government is wasteful and should be limited in its role-that it shouldn't intrude on our lives. Politicians aren't the only ones who hold this view. Many Americans do, too. Now we can't even imagine serious talk of things like full employment or the abolition of prisons. We have to change our view of government, especially when it comes to racial matters. Government policy ensured the vote for African Americans and dismantled legal segregation. Policy established a social safety net for the poor and elderly; it put in place the conditions for the growth of our cities. All of this didn't happen simply because of individual will or thanks to some abstract idea of America. It was tied up with our demands and expectations. Goldwater was wrong. So was Reagan. And, in many ways, so is Obama. Our racial habits are shaped by the kind of society in which we live, and our government plays a big role in shaping that society. As young children, our community offers us a way of seeing the world; it lets us know what is valuable and sacred, and what stands as virtuous behavior and what does not. When Michael Brown's body was left in the street for more than four hours, it sent a dear message about the value of black lives. When everything in our society says that we should be less concerned about black folk, that they are dangerous, that no specific policies can address their misery, we say to our children and to everyone else that these people are "less than"-that they fall outside of our moral concern. We say, without using the word, that they are niggers. One way to change that view is to enact policies that suggest otherwise. Or, to put it another way, to change our view of government, we must change our demands of government. For example, for the past fifty years African American unemployment has been twice that of white unemployment. The 2013 unemployment rate for African Americans stood at 13.1 percent, the highest annual black unemployment rate in more than seventy years. Social scientists do not generally agree on the causes of this trend. Some attribute it to the fact that African Americans are typically the "last hired and first fired." Others point to changes in the nature of the economy; still others point to overt racial discrimination in the labor market. No matter how we account for the numbers, the fact remains that most Americans see double-digit black unemployment as "normal." However, a large-scale, comprehensive jobs agenda with a living wage designed to put Americans, and explicitly African Americans, to work would go a long way toward uprooting the racial habits that inform such a view. It would counter the nonsense that currently stands as a reason for long-term black unemployment in public debate: black folk are lazy and don't want to work. If we hold the view that government plays a crucial role in ensuring the public good-if we believe that all Americans, no matter their race or class, can be vital contributors to our beloved community-then we reject the idea that some populations are disposable, that some people can languish in the shadows while the rest of us dance in the light. The question ''Am I my brother's or my sister's keeper?" is not just a question for the individual or a mantra to motivate the private sector. It is a question answered in the social arrangements that aim to secure the goods and values we most cherish as a community. In other words, we need an idea of government that reflects the value of all Americans, not just white Americans or a few people with a lot of money. We need government seriously committed to racial justice. As a nation, we can never pat ourselves on the back about racial matters. We have too much blood on our hands. Remembering that fact-our inheritance, as Wendell Berry said-does not amount to beating ourselves over the head, or wallowing in guilt, or trading in race cards. Remembering our national sins serves as a check and balance against national hubris. We're reminded of what we are capable of, and our eyes are trained to see that ugliness when it rears its head. But when we disremember-when we forget about the horrors of lynching, lose sight of how African Americans were locked into a dual labor market because of explicit racism, or ignore how we exported our racism around the world-we free ourselves from any sense of accountability. Concern for others and a sense of responsibility for the whole no longer matter. Cruelty and indifference become our calling cards. We have to isolate those areas in which long-standing trends of racial inequality short-circuit the life chances of African Americans. In addition to a jobs agenda, we need a comprehensive government response to the problems of public education and mass incarceration. And I do mean a government response. Private interests have overrun both areas, as privatization drives school reform (and the education of our children is lost in the boisterous battles between teachers' unions and private interests) and as big business makes enormous profits from the warehousing of black and brown people in prisons. Let's be clear: private interests or market-based strategies will not solve the problems we face as a country or bring about the kind of society we need. We have to push for massive government investment in early childhood education and in shifting the center of gravity of our society from punishment to restorative justice. We can begin to enact the latter reform by putting an end to the practice of jailing children. Full stop. We didn't jail children in the past. We don't need to now. In sum, government can help us go a long way toward uprooting racial habits with policies that support jobs with a living wage, which would help wipe out the historic double-digit gap between white and black unemployment; take an expansive approach to early childhood education, which social science research consistently says profoundly affects the life chances of black children; and dismantle the prison-industrial complex. We can no longer believe that disproportionately locking up black men and women constitutes an answer to social ills. This view of government cannot be dismissed as a naive pipe dream, because political considerations relentlessly attack our political imaginations and limit us to the status quo. We are told before we even open our mouths that this particular view won't work or that it will never see the light of day. We've heard enough of that around single payer health care reform and other progressive policies over the Obama years. Such defeatist attitudes conspire to limit our imaginations and make sure that the world stays as it is. But those of us who don't give a damn about the rules of the current political game must courageously organize, advocate, and insist on the moral and political significance of a more robust role for government. We have to change the terms of political debate. Something dramatic has to happen. American democracy has to be remade. John Dewey, the American philosopher, understood this: The very idea of democracy, the meaning of democracy, must be continually explored afresh; it has to be constantly discovered and rediscovered, remade and reorganized; while the political and economic and social institutions in which it is embodied have to be remade and reorganized to meet the changes that are going on in the development of new needs on the part of human beings and new resources for satisfying these needs. Dewey saw American democracy as an unfinished project. He knew that the aims and purposes of this country were not fixed forever in the founding documents, but the particular challenges of our moment required imaginative leaps on behalf of democracy itself. Otherwise, undemocratic forces might prevail; tyranny in the form of the almighty dollar and the relentless pursuit of it might overtake any commitment to the idea of the public good; and bad habits might diminish our moral imaginations. The remaking of America will not happen inside the Beltway. Too many there have too much invested in the status quo. A more robust idea of government will not emerge from the current political parties. Both are beholden to big money. Substantive change will have to come from us. Or, as the great civil rights leader Ella Baker said, "we are the leaders we've been looking for"-a model of leadership that scares the hell out of the Reverena Sharpton. We will have to challenge the status quo in the streets and at the ballot box. In short, it will take a full-blown democratic awakening to enact this revolution. On February 7, 2014, I flew to Raleigh, North Carolina, to join with tens of thousands of other like-minded people to protest the draconian laws passed by the North Carolina state legislature. Since 2010, while many people-especially black people-were still reeling from the 2008 recession/depression, Republicans eliminated Medicaid coverage for half a million North Carolinians, passed a voter-ID law designed to disenfranchise primarily African American voters, transferred $90 million from public schools to voucher schools and cut pre-K for 30,000 children, passed a law requiring women about to have an abortion to listen to the heartbeat of the fetus, repealed the earned income tax credit for 900,000 people, and constitutionally banned gay marriage. North Carolina Republicans had declared war. They represented clear examples of those who hold a view of government that hardens hearts and reinforces racial habits. I watched from afar as the Forward Together moral movement took shape in response. People from all across North Carolina organized and mobilized to take back the state from extremists. The state NAACP, with its charismatic leader, Reverend William Barber II, built a movement from the ground up to challenge what they took to be an allout assault on the moral and social fabric of the state. The movement was not simply a reaction to Tea Party Republicans. "We started this when the Democrats were in power," Barber said. "We put out the word. The state had not complied with the Leandro decision [a 1994 publiceducation-equity lawsuit]. We still had not given public employees collective bargaining rights. We didn't have a racial justice act." But the actions of the North Carolina GOP intensified the group's efforts. More than 900 people who engaged in nonviolent civil disobedience to protest the Republican agenda were arrested during the 2013 legislative session. Reverend Barber put out a call across the country for a massive march in February to launch the 2014 Forward Together campaign. Eighty thousand to 100,000 people answered. It was the largest mass demonstration in the South since the Selma march in 1965. I arrived early. It was cold, and clouds blocked the sun as organizers began to set up. A few people worked on their signs. One sign read PROTECT ALL N.C. CITIZENS with different examples of vulnerable groups written underneath (the mentally ill, the unemployed, teachers, the elderly, students, prisoners, the uninsured, minorities). I was struck from the beginning by the cross-section of people there. Old and young, straight and gay, black, white, and Latino all began to gather. I asked a few of them why they were marching. Leslie Boyd, a white woman from Asheville, North Carolina, told me about her son, Michael Danforth. He had suffered from a birth defect that made it next to impossible for him to get health insurance. He died in the hospital, and ever since, she has dedicated her life to health care activism. She started a small nonprofit called Western North Carolina Health Advocates, through which she met Reverend Barber. He asked her to join the movement. The cold weather drove me into the nearby McDonald's, where several people sipped coffee while they waited for the march to begin. I struck up a conversation with Martin Marshall from Atlanta, Georgia, and Ron Gray from Rock Hill, South Carolina. Martin told me a story about his childhood experiences with racism, about the wall that divided his white community from the black community, and how racism was still alive today. "Voter restrictions and access to health care " were · the reasons he was marching. Ron was less talkative. He said, "I will give you the short form: injustice. I am here because it is the right place to be." Sitting next to Martin and Ron was an older white couple, Bill and Betsy Crittendon from Chapel Hill, North Carolina. They were members of an interracial choir called the United Voices of Praise. They had been involved in interracial social issues for a number of years and found the "regressive policies that have come about in this state [to be] just awful, absolutely awful. They have completely reversed the course of this state." Mrs. Crittendon wasn't too optimistic that the march would change the minds of state legislators, but she and her husband understood the long-term significance of the march and the Forward Together movement. "People need to see and hear what this is all about .... Every step along the way is a building step [to clear] the way for justice issues." These were people from different walks of life who understood the common ground of suffering in this country. For them, that understanding did not require anyone to leave the particulars of their suffering at the door. Anti-racism remained a part of their advocacy whether they struggled for universal health care or a living wage. They joined with others to urge a fundamental change in North Carolina and the country that could help break down racial habits. Reverend Barber thinks of their efforts in this way: [It's] about showing people the intersectionality of their lives; the intersectionality of their moving together . ... We have a phrase: we is the most important word in the justice vocabulary. The issue is not what I can do, but what we can do when we stand together, fight together, pray together, and work together, and we feel movement together. As I finished the conversations in McDonald's, I looked outside. Busload after busload of people had begun to arrive. Before the march began, speakers rallied the crowd. The topics were wide-ranging, from LGBT concerns, the state of public education, issues of immigration and the status of undocumented workers, to racist voter-ID laws. It was an in-the-flesh performance of a multiracial, multi-issue coalition. And whenever someone shouted, "Forward together," the crowd replied, "Not one step back." Initially, to an outsider looking in, the moment resembled the traditional theater of contemporary American protest. A march serves as a moment of catharsis. People gather, tensions are released, folks go back to business as usual, and the men (and it is typically always men) who lead the march leverage the spotlight for personal gain. But a brief glance beneath the surface of this particular gathering revealed something much more expansive. The march was just the tip of an organizing iceberg. Reverend Barber declared, "The Moral March inaugurates a fresh year of grassroots empowerment, voter education, litigation, and nonviolent direct action." In other words, this march wasn't a culmination but a catalyst: it dramatized an organizing effort (which preceded the gathering) that encompassed the courtroom, the ballot box, and the streets. For Barber, the work of democracy doesn't happen through marches or backroom deals but through concerted efforts "to change the context in which power operates." Of course, voting matters. But democracy is about the commitment to get one's hands dirty, and that work is often selfless and thankless. At the heart of those efforts is a more robust conception of government-a belief that government has the capacity to transform lives through focused legislation-and an insistence that we shift the center of moral gravity in North Carolina and in the nation. Five demands guide this insistence: (1) secure pro-labor, anti-poverty policies that ensure economic sustainability; (2) provide well-funded, quality public education to all; (3) stand up for the health of every North Carolinian by promoting health care access and environmental justice across all the state's communities; (4) address the continuing inequalities in the criminal justice system and ensure equality under the law for every person, regardless of race, class, creed, documentation, or sexual preference; and (5) protect and expand voting rights for people of color, immigrants, the elderly, and students to safeguard fair democratic representation. Each demand carries with it an expectation of the role of government in safeguarding the public good and an affirmation of the dignity and standing of all Americans. If we were to embrace these demands as policy, we would be well on our way to a revolution of value. As we marched from historic Shaw University, the place where the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee was founded in April 1960, to the state capitol, Americans from all walks of life expressed a radically egalitarian vision of this country. This vision did not require African Americans to leave their experiences at the door. Alongside demands for marriage equality, cries for support of public education, and calls for a more robust commitment to labor, marchers embraced the call for an anti-racist politics. As Reverend Barber said, "Some people wanted us to emphasize poverty instead of race. But you have to speak the truth. [Race] can be the Achilles' heel of the movement or lend itself to your moral positioning." We have to confront white supremacy, or what Barber calls "the corruption of the spirit and the conscience," as a fundamental contradiction of American democracy, or face the consequences of our silence. As the march concluded, I stood amazed at the power of ordinary people. Thousands of people had come together, for a moment, to declare their commitment to a radical vision of democracy. This is what has been missing in contemporary American politics. Reverend Barber's inspiring remarks struck a chord that reached back to the nineteenthcentury abolitionists, black and white, who decided to become traitors in the name of American democracy. They turned their backs on the slave regime. Barber called us to do the same with the political extremists of our times. We need the kind of language that's not left or right or conservative or liberal, but moral, fusion language that says look: it's extreme and immoral to suppress the right to vote. It's extreme and immoral to deny Medicaid for millions of poor people. . .. It's extreme and immoral to raise taxes on the working poor by cutting earned income taxes and to raise taxes on the poor and middle class in order to cut taxes for the wealthy. It's extreme and immoral to use power to cut off poor people's water in Detroit. That's immoral! What we need to cut off is that kind of abusive power! It's extreme and immoral to re-segregate our schools and underfund our public schools. It's extreme and immoral for people who came from immigrants to now have a mean amnesia and cry out against immigrants and the rights of children . ... That's not just bad policy, it's against the common good and a disregard for human rights. It's a refusal to lean toward the angels of our better selves . ... In policy and politics in America, we face two choices. One is the low road to political destruction, and the other is the pathway to higher ground. Barber finished speaking-preaching, really. The crowd joined hands to sing "We Shall Overcome." The voices were full of emotion and faith, not the sound of trepidation heard in the voices of those who sang the song after Reagan's speech in the Rose Garden. For much of the march, the day had been cloudy and cold. But as he spoke, the sun finally broke through. "The sun has come out," Reverend Barber started to shout. "The sun has come out. We are on our way to higher ground. Even the universe blesses this day. Even the universe says yes to justice, yes to equality, yes to higher ground." Marchers shouted. In front of me stood a white Episcopalian preacher in tears. I wiped my own eyes. This is the kind of social movement that will transform our idea of government. It insists on the dignity and standing of black people and other marginalized groups, and it argues for a dramatic change in what we as Americans care" most about. To be sure, the Forward Together moral movement isn't the only form of struggle we need. (In some ways, Reverend Barber represents the long-standing tradition of the charismatic preacher as leader, although he happens to be aware of the pitfalls of the model of leadership even as he exemplifies it.) It represents just one example of what a democratic awakening must do if we are to change the terms of political debate in this country: it must enact a different way of thinking about government and its relation to the most vulnerable among us.

#### Wholesale rejection of rationality and mastery is incoherent---debate, the ballot, and their argument all rely on those behaviors, and rejecting them ignores their strategic utility for emancipatory politics

**Ruti 17** (Mari, Professor of critical theory and of sexual diversity studies at the University of Toronto, “The Ethiscs of Opting Out: Queer Theory’s Defiant Subjects,” Page 155-156)

While I am at it, let me put some pressure on the wholesale rejection of reason that tends to characterize posthumanist theory, including some versions of queer theory. I am of course aware of the historical violences of Enlightenment reason, including its connection to Western imperialism’s “civilizing” mission. Furthermore, as a feminist, I am familiar with arguments regarding reason’s masculinist biases. And as a psychoanalytic thinker, I recognize the brutality of models of life that overvalue our rational agency at the expense of the body, the passions, the unconscious, and so on. I therefore agree that rationality is not the defining ingredient of human beings. Yet a blanket condemnation of reason seems both reductive and hypocritical—reductive because it discounts the considerable role that rationality plays in human life and hypocritical because it denies that, as academics, we rely on our rational capacities to stage our arguments.

Is it not the case that my ability to speak to you on these pages—and your capacity to process my arguments, critique them, and (hopefully) use them in your own thinking—is predicated on a degree of reason? Indeed, do we not spend much of our careers trying to reason with, and sometimes even outreason, each other? Furthermore, are we not usually trying (at least partially) to “master” something, such as the movement of thought, the organization of ideas, or the craft of writing? This may be idiosyncratic, but I spend a lot of time telling the graduate students whose dissertations I supervise that the organization of their ideas could use some work and that the syntax of their sentences (sometimes) sucks. And I spend even more time rereading my manuscripts in an attempt to make sure that my syntax does not (always) entirely suck. Perhaps this is why I find the unqualified rejection of both reason and mastery that has become habitual in contemporary progressive theory so absurd. True, none of us is fully rational. Nor can we ever fully master anything. Yes, my syntax still sometimes slips. But fortunately it is considerably better than it was when I was nineteen and barely spoke English. Have I tried to master the damn language? Hell yes.

It is in part for such banal reasons that I appreciate Amy Allen’s observation that there is an enormous difference between categorically rejecting reason on the one hand and trying to reenvision it along less tyrannical lines on the other. Referring to Huffer’s interpretation of Foucault in particular, Allen maintains that it is erroneous to assume—as Huffer does—that Foucault’s celebration of madness amounts to an attempt to do away with reason. According to Allen, Foucault undertook “neither a rejection of reason nor a romanticized idealization of unreason” (2013, 22). In other words, Foucault was not interested in destroying reason but rather in historicizing it by examining how it had been constructed at various points in time, how it had been shaped by disciplinary power, and how it had been deployed to meet specific socioeconomic and political goals.

There is no question that this project entailed a critique of the failings of Enlightenment reason. There is also no doubt that reason, for Foucault, was always impure (biased) in being socially contingent. This is why it must be diligently questioned, why we are right to ask how our dominant models of rationality have been implicated in various relations of power. But this does not mean that reason is altogether useless. For example, Allen observes that even though feminists have been at the forefront of criticizing the abuses of reason, they have frequently also found it enabling because it has allowed them to mount their intricate critiques of social hegemonies, including, somewhat ironically, reason’s patriarchal underpinnings. Furthermore, it is precisely the impurity of reason that opens up the possibility of alternative— less repressive, less objectionable—forms of reason. As Foucault explains, “If critical thought itself has a function . . . it is precisely to accept this sort of spiral, this sort of revolving door of rationality that refers us to its necessity, to its indispensability, and, at the same time, to its intrinsic dangers” (2000, 358). Reason, for Foucault, was always contaminated by its context but this, far from negating its value, was what made the reconceptualization of reason feasible in the first place.

#### Academia isn’t a singular monolith – believing it is makes negative aspects inevitable and makes it impossible to engage in targeted, ethical resistance.

Heath et al. 13 – (2013, Mary Heath, Associate Professor at Flinders Law School, and Peter Burdon, Associate Professor at the Adelaide Law School, “Academic Resistance to the Neoliberal University,” 23 Legal Educ. Rev. 379, SSRN)

A Desirable Change and Ethical Resistance

Academics who identify as activists need a clear conception of who or what they are resisting. Put simply, not everything that occurs in universities is neoliberal or undesirable. The university consists of a complex assemblage of structures, values and practices. Like other social institutions, it has evolved over time with reference to the projects of individuals, political groups and other social institutions. Sometimes these forces are place-specific and sometimes they are national (or even international). Projects can also have lives of their own and are reproduced in unpredictable ways as they come together to constitute a particular institution.86 As the outcomes of our efforts and those of others become apparent, further critique and action may be called for, and our strategies and analyses of resistance may require revision.

For these reasons, we suggest that academic activists conceptualise the university as a set of practices that are historically contingent and capable of transformation. This perspective is important, first, because it brings into view the potential for alternatives to the prevailing state of legal education. In contrast, the construction of neoliberalism as ‘necessary and inevitable’ forestalls the possibility of resistance 87 and makes critique appear foolish.88 Second, it means that resistance can also be nuanced and directed at particular structures, practices or values rather than at the university or the tertiary system as a whole. This has obvious implications for the prospects of successful action and for our sense of agency as activists.

The flip side to this conceptualisation is also important. Desirable changes in legal education as well as in Australian universities have taken place during the last few decades as neoliberal practices have also become more and more embedded. As academic activists we need to choose forms of resistance that we believe are ethical and meaningful. We are in no way obliged to oppose every form of change. We might instead choose virtuous compliance with changes we think are desirable,89 or support goals we believe are desirable while opposing forms of implementation we believe are not.

#### Infrapolitics are a disaster – they assume a transformative potential from small moments of resistance that simply does not exist.

Reed 16 (Adolph, Jr., Prof. of Political Science @ Penn., “Splendors and Miseries of the Antiracist “Left”” *Nonsite*, http://nonsite.org/editorial/splendors-and-miseries-of-the-antiracist-left-2)

More than a decade and a half ago I criticized similar formulations of a notion of “infrapolitics,” understood as the domain of pre-political acts of everyday “resistance” undertaken by subordinated populations, which was then all the rage in cultural studies programs. Proponents of the political importance of this domain insisted that, because insurgent movements emerge within such cultures of quotidian resistance, a) examining them could help in understanding the processes through which insurgencies develop and/or b) they therefore ought to be considered as expressions of an insurgent politics themselves. Several factors accounted for the popularity of that version of the argument, which mainly had to do to with the political economy of academic life, including the self-propulsion of academic trendiness and the atrophy of the left outside the academy, which encouraged flights into fantasy for the sake of optimism. The infrapolitics idea also resonated with the substantive but generally unadmitted group essentialism underlying claims that esoteric, insider knowledge is necessary to decipher the “hidden transcripts” of the subordinate populations; put more bluntly, elevating infrapolitics to the domain on which the oppressed express their politics most authentically increased its interpreters’ academic capital.8

I discussed those factors in my critique. However, the point in that argument most pertinent for evaluating Birch and Heideman’s confidence that the contradictions they acknowledge in BLM should be seen only as growing pains of a “new movement” is the following:

At best, those who romanticize “everyday resistance” or “cultural politics” read the evolution of political movements teleologically; they presume that those conditions necessarily, or even typically, lead to political action. They don’t. Not any more than the presence of carbon and water necessarily leads to the evolution of Homo sapiens. Think about it: infrapolitics is ubiquitous, developed political movements are rare.9

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#### Amend the consumer welfare standard to include social and environmental externalities – this is their criticism of antitrust law now

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Competition is the rivalry between suppliers in the market as they strive to get consumers to buy from them.fn1 Competitive markets are exalted for bringing consumers cheap products, and plenty of them. It seems a small leap to assume that a ‘competitive’ market is one with lots of suppliers competing – that must be what politicians mean when they say we should have a competitive economy ‒ right? Possibly. As this book will show, ‘competition’ is often in the eye of the beholder: it can mean many small rivals competing, or it can mean a few companies in fierce contest; it can mean a market with lots of choices, or it can mean one company heralded as the most ‘competitive’ of all (generally this is the competitiveness politicians have in mind). We can all agree that competition is good precisely because we all mean different things by it.

What is vitally important, but often overlooked when we glorify competition, is that it matters what exactly companies are competing for. In a free market, companies are free to pursue power and profits in ways that harm society and the planet. Uber is able to under-provide worker protections for drivers and grow exponentially by trampling over local regulations; meanwhile society pays for the social safety net that Uber does not itself supply. Social media companies build a business model of ‘free’ products commercialized through surveillance and data extraction, but when a democratic election is subverted it affects even those who do not use the platforms – the effects spill out into the wider world. Global banks are able to take risks for which we all must pay the price when the entire financial system is brought to the brink of collapse. Energy companies can conceal the true cost of burning fossil fuels until the problem is so widespread and their activities are so systemically important that we are paralysed into inaction ‒ even when faced with the extinction of our own species. And clothing retailers are allowed to turn a blind eye to the conditions in their supply chains, enabling them to keep costs down with this delinquency.

These social and environmental costs that are not accounted for in the market transactions that generate them are what economists call ‘externalities’, and it is easy to see that a free market will produce many such costs – too many – as, by definition, no one in particular is held accountable for them.

But externalities are not accidents. Creating negative spillovers is what many companies, programmed to maximize returns for shareholders, are implicitly designed to do. The parallel tyranny of consumers and shareholders gives rise to repellent breaches of sound economic or ecosystem organization in favour of corporate interests and the accumulation of corporate power, all in the name of competition.

Competition, and the faith we place in competition to benefit us all and to disperse power throughout the economy, is the critical blind spot that lies unexamined within capitalist doctrine, and it looms large in our economic policy, an elephant that completely crowds out everything else in the room. It is the plot twist in our free market story, laid bare by Rana Plaza ‒ the collapsed building and the pile of bodies. It is a truth sitting buried underneath the neoliberal monolith that has come to circumscribe all that is relevant to public policy.

We have steadfastly ignored the reality of corporate power, especially when it comes to regulating big companies. It even feels like a betrayal of free market ideology to single out big corporations – there is something unsophisticated about failing to appreciate the benefits of bigness when everyone knows that globe-spanning multinationals are more efficient than local businesses, don’t they? But this terra incognita is exactly where we must step if we are to gain purchase on the crises that threaten our society and planet. Nothing should be taken for granted ‒ even, or especially, the role of the most significant and substantial actors in the industries over which they claim their dominion.

Free market myths

One blind spot – so how hard can it be to see clearly past it? Extremely hard.

As I found out when I opened Pandora’s box, behind that one blind spot sit six free market myths that urge us to reconsider any attempt to recalibrate free market competition. One or more of these myths is at play whenever free market logic is called into question, and the myth usually wins.

So here they are, six commonly accepted myths which, as we shall see, have roots in eighteenth-century economic thinking, laid out and ready for a fresh evaluation in the cold, hard light of the twenty-first century.

Myth #1: Free markets are competitive. • Myth #2: Companies compete by trying to best respond to the needs of society. • Myth #3: Corporate power is benign. • Myth #4: We already control corporate power with antitrust. • Myth #5: The law requires companies to maximize financial value for shareholders. • Myth #6: We are all shareholders; we all benefit from corporate focus on shareholders’ interests.

Remarkably, these myths ‒ mere stories about how the economy might theoretically work ‒ have been enshrined in the law and in business practice. And the flipside of these arguments – that government and society are inefficient, wasteful, bureaucratic and not innovative – becomes the justification for non-intervention in the market.

In this book we will take each of these myths in turn to reveal the reality that is currently being obscured. Free market competition does not disperse power, it creates power. In fact ‘competition’ has come to be synonymous with market domination. Companies compete for power, for the benefit of their shareholders, in ways that harm society. There are many types of corporate power that allow the powerful to choose how to shape the economy and society in their interests. Modern antitrust does little to constrain corporate power and, instead, condones it. Corporate directors need not maximize shareholder returns ‒ the law is being wilfully misinterpreted to our collective detriment. This is doubly damaging because most shareholders are already wealthy.

There have been many attempts to debunk the principles of ‘neoliberalism’ – the overarching ideology that these myths serve to reinforce. The challenge is to do something with the insight that things do not need to be ‒ and should not be ‒ this way. We need to act on the knowledge that we are being governed by a defunct system of beliefs that is driving us off a cliff. In this book I will engage with ideas about how to change the regulation of corporate power – how to acknowledge power in all its guises, to restrain excessive corporate power and to redistribute the remaining power more equally across society.

What has become clear is that the unwavering focus on shareholder returns and profit is endangering lives, threatening society and compromising the habitability of our planet. Governments struggle to keep up with an economic system designed to devour the world and every resource within it, and it has taken us longer than it should have to face up to the fact that we are living precariously on a finite, crowded and divided planet that is steadily getting warmer.

The costs of free markets and the true power of companies have been completely removed from our analysis exactly where this would be most relevant – in the discipline of antitrust, which is meant to deliver the vaunted benefits of competition to the masses. Antitrust law is supposed to protect competition, promote market fairness and prevent power from accumulating. But power and externalities have been slowly displaced in antitrust thinking, replaced instead by a single-minded focus on low prices for consumers. Economic democracy is equated with the opportunity to spend, and to buy more and more, even whilst the tragic collapse of our ecosystem is unfolding.

Once we are released from the hypnotic hold of these free market myths, we will be free to reconfigure capitalism in fundamental ways, safe in the knowledge that the alarmist warnings of doom that greet anyone attempting to step beyond neoliberalism are there to serve the interests of the few, not the many.

Power, power everywhere, and not a drop to drink

These free market myths were inserted into antitrust thinking as the discipline came to be dominated by economics. The result is that competition law, like many other areas of law, has become an increasingly technocratic field. It is now a niche discipline that most people find impenetrable if they have not dedicated their lives to it. And it turns out that this veil of ignorance, which the antitrust community tends to reinforce rather than remove, has done us a collective disservice. Without full public understanding and oversight, antitrust has supervised the grand reshaping of our economic world into what it is today.

Within antitrust, there has been a wholesale shift over the last century from a discussion of power, democracy and the best way to organize a just society, towards a narrow assessment of the economic welfare of prototypical consumers. There is so much that this version of economics leaves out, assumes away, ignores or minimizes, and many of our fears, concerns and vulnerabilities fall between those cracks. We no longer challenge corporate power at its heart by dissolving companies whose corporate abuses subvert the public interest. We have moved from the language of politics and social justice, comprehensible to the lay person, to the vocabulary and formulae of economics, unintelligible even to many of the officials responsible for administering the competition regime.

In the meantime, antitrust practitioners have managed to diligently develop a complicated regulatory framework for market power that somehow allows markets to consolidate anyway. Even more egregiously, we – as a society ‒ have misconstrued the true nature of corporate power itself. We cannot see what is right in front of us. Antitrust’s fixation with price, although amenable to economic quantification, will not help us contain power beyond the economist’s narrowly construed definition of market power. If we only look at whether prices will go up or down, we cannot capture the many broader, more subtle, surreptitious and insidious ways in which companies can bend the economy and society to their will.

Regulators – antitrust authorities included – have their work cut out for them as the impacts of corporate conduct refuse to limit themselves to national jurisdictional boundaries. With the majority of the world’s biggest companies headquartered in America, and with the American regulatory approach historically influential across the world, we must all look to the United States to understand how we arrived at our world of big, unaccountable companies and how we might move forward.

The global community of antitrust lawyers, economists, officials, scholars and practitioners must face up to what has been a profound dereliction of duty. Charged with safeguarding the progress of industrial development, we adopted such a narrow interpretation of our task that we managed to supervise the mass consolidation of industry on the blanket, untested and rather naive assumption that, with the potential for low prices always dangled before our eyes, no harm could come from the rise of colossal companies. It happened on our watch.

Thankfully, times are changing. In 2019, the influential Business Roundtable group of 180 CEOs of America’s most powerful companies declared that shareholder value would no longer rule supreme in the boardrooms of their companies – although it remains to be seen whether they really mean it. The Scottish Government, the Welsh Assembly and the UK Parliament each declared a climate emergency. In the US, antitrust authorities have opened investigations into the power of the tech titans, dozens of attorneys general across the United States are bringing cases against Facebook and Google, and presidential candidates Elizabeth Warren and Bernie Sanders have placed antitrust at the top of the agenda, alongside an attempt to create real corporate responsibility for the biggest companies.

But there are two separate conversations happening: about corporate power and monopoly on the one hand, and shareholder value and corporate responsibility on the other. Until we realize that these are actually the same conversation – that corporate power can undermine corporate responsibility and that corporate responsibility is meaningless if companies are slavishly pursuing power – then we will not be able to start the hard work of re-engineering global capitalism for a sustainable, or even survivable, future.

#### – Debate does not change the fundamental values of its participants, but it does trend them away from over-reliance on their initial, unvetted gut reactions to symbolic politics in favor of more complex, deep understandings of issues – that takes out their link turn and magnifies the link

Niemeyer 11 [Simon Niemeyer, Centre for Deliberative Global Governance, Research School of Social Sciences, The Australian National University. The Emancipatory Effect of Deliberation: Empirical Lessons from Mini-Publics. 2011. https://unige.ch/sciences-societe/socio/files/2114/0533/6108/002.pdf]

The results of the two case studies in this article suggest that deliberation does not fundamentally change individuals or inculcate a sense of moral duty. The particular values that prevailed in both issues were always present (and measurable), even if they were latent in expressed preferences. Before deliberation, most participants believed they were acting in the public interest,69 but good intentions alone are not sufficient to formulate civic-minded preferences. Predeliberative preferences were more strongly influenced by discourses associated with symbolic politics. Following deliberation, symbolic cues reduced the “cost” of arriving at a decision,70 but the cognitive shortcut resulted in positions that did not properly reflect participants’ overall subjectivity.

Before deliberation, symbolic politics—or at least the mere presence of potent symbols—distorted participants’ preferences. This process may be manipulative and overt, as in the case of the Bloomfield Track, or incidental, as in the case of the Fremantle Bridge. Deliberation successfully corrected the influence of symbolic politics because it provided both the incentive and the means to develop positions on an intersubjective set of recognized issues that extended beyond the narrow set of unhelpful symbolic ones. The mechanism whereby this occurred did not so much involve changing incentive structures, as predicted by institutional rational choice.71 Rather, it changed the decision pathway from a casual understanding of emotionally appealing content to a deeper understanding that allowed participants to better express their own subjectivity. The change was as much a function of stripping away the impact of symbolic arguments as it was due to participants’ increased ability and willingness to deal with issue complexity. This suggests that the transformative effect might be more easily replicated in the wider public sphere than is ordinarily

#### Jones says that policy makers control power and will not be overrun by critical theory – that means that ONLY our model imbues debaters with the potential to make change through the language of policy with radical ideas – think AOC and Bernie Sanders

Dr. Lee Jones 9, DPhil and MPhil from Oxford University, Reader in International Relations at Queen Mary, University of London, “International Relations Scholarship and the Tyranny of Policy Relevance”, Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 1, p. 125-130

However, the general complaint is a common enough refrain, not just in the US but in the UK – that academics must be ‘policy relevant’ in their choice of research topics, their research methodology, and the way they disseminate their findings to various so-called ‘stakeholders’. In the UK, this imperative is reinforced by the bureaucratic *diktat* of the various government-backed funding councils. It fits with the viewpoint enunciated since the 1980s that (a) the primary task of academics is research and (b) academics must be ‘accountable’ for the way they spend public money. It naturally follows from this that academics should do ‘relevant’ research (who would defend ‘irrelevant’ research?) which addresses itself to the contemporary requirements of policy (or the economy – a subject for another time).

Despite acquiring a taken-for-granted quality, these ideas are a very recent innovation. For centuries, the job of people staffing universities was primarily to teach their students, not to conduct research. Then, only a few decades into an age where ordinary people could aspire for the first time to become university students, suddenly the mission of universities underwent radical transformation as governments refused to allocate the necessary money to fund this expansion in higher education, forcing universities instead to compete for funding through exercises designed to assess their research output – what became known in the UK as the Research Assessment Exercise. The growing subordination of the academy to political and economic imperatives was recently expressed in the abolition of the government department for ‘innovation, universities and skills’, with power over universities being transferred to the department for business.

The history is somewhat different in the US, where the expansion of higher education to include the working classes has largely involved the grossly underfunded expansion of largely state and community colleges. Elite, Ivy League schools have expanded their undergraduate numbers but much undergraduate teaching is hived off to graduate students whose own studies are correspondingly extended; only those who can afford to take a Masters degree may be taught by the academics whose ‘big names’ attracted them in the first place. It is a good thing that research is now carried out in specialised institutions by people enjoying (supposed) academic freedom. Along the way, however, it might well be argued that the academy’s initial mission has actually been usurped.

Putting those questions aside for now, what of the broader relationship between the state and the academy? Let us concede that Nye has a point, even if he is taking aim at the wrong targets. We should concede that academics are often poor at communicating their ideas to society at large. All too often we are content to write for each other, knowing full well that our work will never be consumed beyond a narrow, disciplinary clique. We need to do much better. Equally, however, there is no need to reduce this to the banal process of ‘knowledge transfer’ being promoted by the UK research councils, which seeks to justify research by appealing to its value to British firms. We should be trying to communicate our work to our students, trade unions, citizens’ groups, non-governmental organisations, and citizens who are simply curious about the world – not to improve companies’ balance sheets but to play a positive role in ‘cultivating our humanity’ as Seneca once urged (Nussbaum, 1997).

Nye also complains that the American Political Science Review never publishes policy-relevant articles – or even articles that policymakers can comprehend. That is undeniably true, but the real problem here is actually one of methodology – which he hints at by swiping at scholars obsessed with modelling. What he really criticises is the mania for quantitative methods and formal modelling that has gripped the US academy and which is gradually infecting the British academy. The most influential IR journals, like Foreign Affairs, contain absolutely no articles of a quantitative bent.

There is no doubt that the average APSR article is impenetrable to any normal person lacking econometric training, but this is not the only reason such research is not policy relevant: it is also because very few questions of major import actually lend themselves to being studied properly in this fashion. Hedley Bull once commented that a commitment to quantitative methods is a commitment to the ‘marginalia of the subject that are susceptible of measurement and direct observation’ (Bull, 1966, p. 363). The real problem is that marginalia are increasingly the core of our discipline. This is clearly linked to the overall conception of social science to which we subscribe – whether we believe people are like particles and can be studied using similar methods to those used in Physics.

Our beliefs about social science are influenced strongly by the overall political economy of research funding – Physics attracts the most funding as a ‘hard’ science; Economics models itself on Physics to attract the most funding in the social sciences; and the other, envious social sciences model themselves on Economics. Physics undeniably generates a great deal of very useful research (although the constant push for immediately ‘useful’ research ‘outputs’ may well now be undermining ‘blue skies’ research that expands the limits of human understanding). Whether Economics has done likewise is clearly open to debate, especially in light of the current global economic crisis. Ironically, IR scholars still labour beneath the shadow of the work of Kenneth Waltz, who sought explicitly to import models used in Economics to understand the emergence of a balance of power between states. At root this is a problem of all human knowledge being judged by a set of extremely idealised, monolithic notions of how ‘science’ works.1

The more abstract and bizarre these models become, the more removed they become from reality, the less impact they are likely to have on reality in turn. But the problem here is not ‘policy relevance’ – it is rather a two-fold issue: a far deeper philosophical question as to what social science can accomplish and what it is for, combined with a funding structure which assumes the wrong answer to these questions. Policy-relevant material will not be produced by the sort of exhortations Nye issues, but only by addressing these two broader issues.

Having conceded where Nye has a point, let’s now consider the ways in which he may simply be wrong. His assumption is that the academic should be, needs to be, policy-relevant. As indicated above, this can be a very pernicious assumption. As an invitation to academics to contribute to discussions about the direction of society and policy, no one could reasonably object: those who wished to contribute could do so, while others could be left to investigate topics of perhaps dubious immediate ‘relevance’ that nonetheless enrich human understanding and thus contribute to the accumulation of knowledge and general social progress (and, quite probably, to those scholars’ research communities and their students). As an imperative, however, it creates all sorts of distortions that are injurious to academic freedom. It encourages academics to study certain things, in certain ways, with certain outcomes and certain ways of disseminating one’s findings. This ‘encouragement’ is more or less coercive, backed as it is by the allure of large research grants which advance one’s institution and personal career, versus the threat of a fate as an entirely marginal scholar incapable of attracting research funding – a nowadays a standard criteria for academic employment and promotion.

Furthermore, those funding ‘policy-relevant’ research already have predefined notions of what is ‘relevant’. This means both that academics risk being drawn into policy-based evidence-making, rather than its much-vaunted opposite, and that academics will tend to be selected by the policy world based on whether they will reflect, endorse and legitimise the overall interests and ideologies that underpin the prevailing order.

Consider the examples Nye gives as leading examples of policy-relevant scholars: Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski, both of whom served as National Security Advisers (under Nixon and Carter respectively), while Kissinger also went on to become Secretary of State (under Nixon and Ford). Kissinger, as is now widely known, is a war criminal who does not travel very much outside the USA for fear of being arrested à la General Pinochet (Hitchens, 2001). Brzezinski has not yet been subject to the same scrutiny and even popped up to advise Obama recently, but can hardly be regarded as a particularly progressive individual. Under his watch, after Vietnam overthrew the genocidal Khmer Rouge in 1978, Washington sent tens of millions of dollars to help them regroup and rearm on Thai soil as a proxy force against Hanoi (Peou, 2000, p. 143). Clearly, a rejection of US imperialism was not part of whatever Kissinger and Brzezinski added to the policy mix.

In addition to them, Nye says that of the top twenty-five most influential scholars as identified by a recent survey, only three have served in policy circles (Jordan et al, 2009). This apparently referred to himself (ranked sixth), Samuel Huntington (eighth), and John Ikenberry (twenty-fourth).2 Huntington, despite his reputation for iconoclasm, never strayed far from reflecting elite concerns and prejudices (Jones, 2009). Nye and Ikenberry, despite their more ‘liberal’ credentials, have built their careers around the project of institutionalising, preserving and extending American hegemony. This concern in Nye’s work spans from After Hegemony (1984), his book co-authored with Robert Keohane (rated first most influential), which explicitly sought to maintain US power through institutional means, through cheer-leading post-Cold War US hegemony in Bound to Lead (1990), to his exhortations for Washington to regain its battered post-Iraq standing in Soft Power: The Means to Succeed in International Politics (2004). Ikenberry, who was a State Department advisor in 2003-04, has a very similar trajectory. He only criticised the Bush administration’s ‘imperial ambition’ on the pragmatic grounds that empire was not attainable, not that it was undesirable, and he is currently engaged in a Nye-esque project proposing ways to bolster the US-led ‘liberal’ order.

These scholars’ commitment to the continued ‘benign’ dominance of US values, capital and power overrides any superficial dissimilarities occasioned by their personal ‘conservative’ or ‘liberal’ predilections. It is this that qualifies them to act as advisers to the modern-day ‘prince’; genuinely critical voices are unlikely to ever hear the call to serve. The idea of, say, Noam Chomsky as Assistant Secretary of State is simply absurd.

At stake here is the fundamental distinction between ‘problem-solving’ and ‘critical’ theory, which Robert Cox introduced in a famous article in 1981. Cox argued that theory, despite being presented as a neutral analytical tool, was ‘always for someone and for some purpose’. Problem-solving theories ultimately endorsed the prevailing system by generating suggestions as to how the system could be run more smoothly. Critical theories, by contrast, seek to explain why the system exists in the first place and what could be done to transform it. What unifies Nye, Ikenberry Huntington, Brzezinski and Kissinger (along with the majority of IR scholars) is their problem-solving approach. Naturally, policy-makers want academics to be problemsolvers, since policies seek precisely to – well, solve problems. But this does not necessarily mean that this should be the function of the academy.

Indeed, the tyranny of ‘policy relevance’ achieves its most destructive form when it becomes so dominant that it imperils the space the academy is supposed to provide to allow scholars to think about the foundations of prevailing orders in a critical, even hostile, fashion. Taking clear inspiration from Marx, Cox produced pathbreaking work showing how different social orders, corresponding to different modes of production, generated different world orders, and looked for contradictions within the existing orders to see how the world might be changing.1 Marxist theories of world order are unlikely to be seen as very ‘policy relevant’ by capitalist elites (despite the fact that, where Marxist theory is good, it is not only ‘critical’ but also potentially ‘problem-solving’, a possibility that Cox overlooked). Does this mean that such inquiry should be replaced by government-funded policy wonkery? Absolutely not, especially when we consider the horrors that entails. At one recent conference, for instance, a Kings College London team which had won a gargantuan sum of money from the government to study civil contingency plans in the event of terrorist attacks presented their ‘research outputs’. They suggested a raft of measures to securitise everyday life, including developing clearly sign-posted escape routes from London to enable citizens to flee the capital. There are always plenty of academics who are willing to turn their hand to repressive, official agendas. There are some who produce fine problem-solving work who ought to disseminate their ideas much more widely, beyond the narrow confines of academia. There are far fewer who are genuinely critical. The political economy of research funding combines with the tyranny of ‘policy relevance’ to entrench a hierarchy topped by tame academics.

‘Policy relevance’, then, is a double-edged sword. No one would wish to describe their work as ‘irrelevant’, so the key question, as always, is ‘relevant to whom?’ Relevance to one’s research community, students, and so on, ought to be more than enough justification for academic freedom, provided that scholars shoulder their responsibilities to teach and to communicate their subjects to society at large, and thus repay something to the society that supports them. But beyond that, we also need to fully respect work that will never be ‘policy-relevant’, because it refuses to swallow fashionable concerns or toe the line on government agendas. Truly critical voices are worth more to the progress of human civilisation than ten thousand Deputy Undersecretaries of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology.

#### But Jones is about what is or is not ‘policy relevant’ as whether or whether not it solidifies forms of dominant competition – the TVA would definitely meet the threshold to being outside the scope but it would still be in the language of policy which solves best – obviously Kissinger, the card’s example, isn’t the TVA

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The more abstract and bizarre these models become, the more removed they become from reality, the less impact they are likely to have on reality in turn. But the problem here is not ‘policy relevance’ – it is rather a two-fold issue: a far deeper philosophical question as to what social science can accomplish and what it is for, combined with a funding structure which assumes the wrong answer to these questions. Policy-relevant material will not be produced by the sort of exhortations Nye issues, but only by addressing these two broader issues.

Having conceded where Nye has a point, let’s now consider the ways in which he may simply be wrong. His assumption is that the academic should be, needs to be, policy-relevant. As indicated above, this can be a very pernicious assumption. As an invitation to academics to contribute to discussions about the direction of society and policy, no one could reasonably object: those who wished to contribute could do so, while others could be left to investigate topics of perhaps dubious immediate ‘relevance’ that nonetheless enrich human understanding and thus contribute to the accumulation of knowledge and general social progress (and, quite probably, to those scholars’ research communities and their students). As an imperative, however, it creates all sorts of distortions that are injurious to academic freedom. It encourages academics to study certain things, in certain ways, with certain outcomes and certain ways of disseminating one’s findings. This ‘encouragement’ is more or less coercive, backed as it is by the allure of large research grants which advance one’s institution and personal career, versus the threat of a fate as an entirely marginal scholar incapable of attracting research funding – a nowadays a standard criteria for academic employment and promotion.

Furthermore, those funding ‘policy-relevant’ research already have predefined notions of what is ‘relevant’. This means both that academics risk being drawn into policy-based evidence-making, rather than its much-vaunted opposite, and that academics will tend to be selected by the policy world based on whether they will reflect, endorse and legitimise the overall interests and ideologies that underpin the prevailing order.

Consider the examples Nye gives as leading examples of policy-relevant scholars: Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski, both of whom served as National Security Advisers (under Nixon and Carter respectively), while Kissinger also went on to become Secretary of State (under Nixon and Ford). Kissinger, as is now widely known, is a war criminal who does not travel very much outside the USA for fear of being arrested à la General Pinochet (Hitchens, 2001). Brzezinski has not yet been subject to the same scrutiny and even popped up to advise Obama recently, but can hardly be regarded as a particularly progressive individual. Under his watch, after Vietnam overthrew the genocidal Khmer Rouge in 1978, Washington sent tens of millions of dollars to help them regroup and rearm on Thai soil as a proxy force against Hanoi (Peou, 2000, p. 143). Clearly, a rejection of US imperialism was not part of whatever Kissinger and Brzezinski added to the policy mix.

In addition to them, Nye says that of the top twenty-five most influential scholars as identified by a recent survey, only three have served in policy circles (Jordan et al, 2009). This apparently referred to himself (ranked sixth), Samuel Huntington (eighth), and John Ikenberry (twenty-fourth).2 Huntington, despite his reputation for iconoclasm, never strayed far from reflecting elite concerns and prejudices (Jones, 2009). Nye and Ikenberry, despite their more ‘liberal’ credentials, have built their careers around the project of institutionalising, preserving and extending American hegemony. This concern in Nye’s work spans from After Hegemony (1984), his book co-authored with Robert Keohane (rated first most influential), which explicitly sought to maintain US power through institutional means, through cheer-leading post-Cold War US hegemony in Bound to Lead (1990), to his exhortations for Washington to regain its battered post-Iraq standing in Soft Power: The Means to Succeed in International Politics (2004). Ikenberry, who was a State Department advisor in 2003-04, has a very similar trajectory. He only criticised the Bush administration’s ‘imperial ambition’ on the pragmatic grounds that empire was not attainable, not that it was undesirable, and he is currently engaged in a Nye-esque project proposing ways to bolster the US-led ‘liberal’ order.

These scholars’ commitment to the continued ‘benign’ dominance of US values, capital and power overrides any superficial dissimilarities occasioned by their personal ‘conservative’ or ‘liberal’ predilections. It is this that qualifies them to act as advisers to the modern-day ‘prince’; genuinely critical voices are unlikely to ever hear the call to serve. The idea of, say, Noam Chomsky as Assistant Secretary of State is simply absurd.

At stake here is the fundamental distinction between ‘problem-solving’ and ‘critical’ theory, which Robert Cox introduced in a famous article in 1981. Cox argued that theory, despite being presented as a neutral analytical tool, was ‘always for someone and for some purpose’. Problem-solving theories ultimately endorsed the prevailing system by generating suggestions as to how the system could be run more smoothly. Critical theories, by contrast, seek to explain why the system exists in the first place and what could be done to transform it. What unifies Nye, Ikenberry Huntington, Brzezinski and Kissinger (along with the majority of IR scholars) is their problem-solving approach. Naturally, policy-makers want academics to be problemsolvers, since policies seek precisely to – well, solve problems. But this does not necessarily mean that this should be the function of the academy.

Indeed, the tyranny of ‘policy relevance’ achieves its most destructive form when it becomes so dominant that it imperils the space the academy is supposed to provide to allow scholars to think about the foundations of prevailing orders in a critical, even hostile, fashion. Taking clear inspiration from Marx, Cox produced pathbreaking work showing how different social orders, corresponding to different modes of production, generated different world orders, and looked for contradictions within the existing orders to see how the world might be changing.1 Marxist theories of world order are unlikely to be seen as very ‘policy relevant’ by capitalist elites (despite the fact that, where Marxist theory is good, it is not only ‘critical’ but also potentially ‘problem-solving’, a possibility that Cox overlooked). Does this mean that such inquiry should be replaced by government-funded policy wonkery? Absolutely not, especially when we consider the horrors that entails. At one recent conference, for instance, a Kings College London team which had won a gargantuan sum of money from the government to study civil contingency plans in the event of terrorist attacks presented their ‘research outputs’. They suggested a raft of measures to securitise everyday life, including developing clearly sign-posted escape routes from London to enable citizens to flee the capital. There are always plenty of academics who are willing to turn their hand to repressive, official agendas. There are some who produce fine problem-solving work who ought to disseminate their ideas much more widely, beyond the narrow confines of academia. There are far fewer who are genuinely critical. The political economy of research funding combines with the tyranny of ‘policy relevance’ to entrench a hierarchy topped by tame academics.

‘Policy relevance’, then, is a double-edged sword. No one would wish to describe their work as ‘irrelevant’, so the key question, as always, is ‘relevant to whom?’ Relevance to one’s research community, students, and so on, ought to be more than enough justification for academic freedom, provided that scholars shoulder their responsibilities to teach and to communicate their subjects to society at large, and thus repay something to the society that supports them. But beyond that, we also need to fully respect work that will never be ‘policy-relevant’, because it refuses to swallow fashionable concerns or toe the line on government agendas. Truly critical voices are worth more to the progress of human civilisation than ten thousand Deputy Undersecretaries of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology.

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### Case

#### Warming leads to extinction

Kareiva 18, Ph.D. in ecology and applied mathematics from Cornell University, director of the Institute of the Environment and Sustainability at UCLA, Pritzker Distinguished Professor in Environment & Sustainability at UCLA, et al. (Peter, “Existential risk due to ecosystem collapse: Nature strikes back,” *Futures*, 102)

In summary, six of the nine proposed planetary boundaries (phosphorous, nitrogen, biodiversity, land use, atmospheric aerosol loading, and chemical pollution) are unlikely to be associated with existential risks. They all correspond to a degraded environment, but in our assessment do not represent existential risks. However, the three remaining boundaries (climate change, global freshwater cycle, and ocean acidification) do pose existential risks. This is because of intrinsic positive feedback loops, substantial lag times between system change and experiencing the consequences of that change, and the fact these different boundaries interact with one another in ways that yield surprises. In addition, climate, freshwater, and ocean acidification are all directly connected to the provision of food and water, and shortages of food and water can create conflict and social unrest. Climate change has a long history of disrupting civilizations and sometimes precipitating the collapse of cultures or mass emigrations (McMichael, 2017). For example, the 12th century drought in the North American Southwest is held responsible for the collapse of the Anasazi pueblo culture. More recently, the infamous potato famine of 1846–1849 and the large migration of Irish to the U.S. can be traced to a combination of factors, one of which was climate. Specifically, 1846 was an unusually warm and moist year in Ireland, providing the climatic conditions favorable to the fungus that caused the potato blight. As is so often the case, poor government had a role as well—as the British government forbade the import of grains from outside Britain (imports that could have helped to redress the ravaged potato yields). Climate change intersects with freshwater resources because it is expected to exacerbate drought and water scarcity, as well as flooding. Climate change can even impair water quality because it is associated with heavy rains that overwhelm sewage treatment facilities, or because it results in higher concentrations of pollutants in groundwater as a result of enhanced evaporation and reduced groundwater recharge. Ample clean water is not a luxury—it is essential for human survival. Consequently, cities, regions and nations that lack clean freshwater are vulnerable to social disruption and disease. Finally, ocean acidification is linked to climate change because it is driven by CO2 emissions just as global warming is. With close to 20% of the world’s protein coming from oceans (FAO, 2016), the potential for severe impacts due to acidification is obvious. Less obvious, but perhaps more insidious, is the interaction between climate change and the loss of oyster and coral reefs due to acidification. Acidification is known to interfere with oyster reef building and coral reefs. Climate change also increases storm frequency and severity. Coral reefs and oyster reefs provide protection from storm surge because they reduce wave energy (Spalding et al., 2014). If these reefs are lost due to acidification at the same time as storms become more severe and sea level rises, coastal communities will be exposed to unprecedented storm surge—and may be ravaged by recurrent storms. A key feature of the risk associated with climate change is that mean annual temperature and mean annual rainfall are not the variables of interest. Rather it is extreme episodic events that place nations and entire regions of the world at risk. These extreme events are by definition “rare” (once every hundred years), and changes in their likelihood are challenging to detect because of their rarity, but are exactly the manifestations of climate change that we must get better at anticipating (Diffenbaugh et al., 2017). Society will have a hard time responding to shorter intervals between rare extreme events because in the lifespan of an individual human, a person might experience as few as two or three extreme events. How likely is it that you would notice a change in the interval between events that are separated by decades, especially given that the interval is not regular but varies stochastically? A concrete example of this dilemma can be found in the past and expected future changes in storm-related flooding of New York City. The highly disruptive flooding of New York City associated with Hurricane Sandy represented a flood height that occurred once every 500 years in the 18th century, and that occurs now once every 25 years, but is expected to occur once every 5 years by 2050 (Garner et al., 2017). This change in frequency of extreme floods has profound implications for the measures New York City should take to protect its infrastructure and its population, yet because of the stochastic nature of such events, this shift in flood frequency is an elevated risk that will go unnoticed by most people. 4. The combination of positive feedback loops and societal inertia is fertile ground for global environmental catastrophes Humans are remarkably ingenious, and have adapted to crises throughout their history. Our doom has been repeatedly predicted, only to be averted by innovation (Ridley, 2011). However, the many stories of human ingenuity successfully addressing existential risks such as global famine or extreme air pollution represent environmental challenges that are largely linear, have immediate consequences, and operate without positive feedbacks. For example, the fact that food is in short supply does not increase the rate at which humans consume food—thereby increasing the shortage. Similarly, massive air pollution episodes such as the London fog of 1952 that killed 12,000 people did not make future air pollution events more likely. In fact it was just the opposite—the London fog sent such a clear message that Britain quickly enacted pollution control measures (Stradling, 2016). Food shortages, air pollution, water pollution, etc. send immediate signals to society of harm, which then trigger a negative feedback of society seeking to reduce the harm. In contrast, today’s great environmental crisis of climate change may cause some harm but there are generally long time delays between rising CO2 concentrations and damage to humans. The consequence of these delays are an absence of urgency; thus although 70% of Americans believe global warming is happening, only 40% think it will harm them (http://climatecommunication.yale.edu/visualizations-data/ycom-us-2016/). Secondly, unlike past environmental challenges, the Earth’s climate system is rife with positive feedback loops. In particular, as CO2 increases and the climate warms, that very warming can cause more CO2 release which further increases global warming, and then more CO2, and so on. Table 2 summarizes the best documented positive feedback loops for the Earth’s climate system. These feedbacks can be neatly categorized into carbon cycle, biogeochemical, biogeophysical, cloud, ice-albedo, and water vapor feedbacks. As important as it is to understand these feedbacks individually, it is even more essential to study the interactive nature of these feedbacks. Modeling studies show that when interactions among feedback loops are included, uncertainty increases dramatically and there is a heightened potential for perturbations to be magnified (e.g., Cox, Betts, Jones, Spall, & Totterdell, 2000; Hajima, Tachiiri, Ito, & Kawamiya, 2014; Knutti & Rugenstein, 2015; Rosenfeld, Sherwood, Wood, & Donner, 2014). This produces a wide range of future scenarios. Positive feedbacks in the carbon cycle involves the enhancement of future carbon contributions to the atmosphere due to some initial increase in atmospheric CO2. This happens because as CO2 accumulates, it reduces the efficiency in which oceans and terrestrial ecosystems sequester carbon, which in return feeds back to exacerbate climate change (Friedlingstein et al., 2001). Warming can also increase the rate at which organic matter decays and carbon is released into the atmosphere, thereby causing more warming (Melillo et al., 2017). Increases in food shortages and lack of water is also of major concern when biogeophysical feedback mechanisms perpetuate drought conditions. The underlying mechanism here is that losses in vegetation increases the surface albedo, which suppresses rainfall, and thus enhances future vegetation loss and more suppression of rainfall—thereby initiating or prolonging a drought (Chamey, Stone, & Quirk, 1975). To top it off, overgrazing depletes the soil, leading to augmented vegetation loss (Anderies, Janssen, & Walker, 2002). Climate change often also increases the risk of forest fires, as a result of higher temperatures and persistent drought conditions. The expectation is that forest fires will become more frequent and severe with climate warming and drought (Scholze, Knorr, Arnell, & Prentice, 2006), a trend for which we have already seen evidence (Allen et al., 2010). Tragically, the increased severity and risk of Southern California wildfires recently predicted by climate scientists (Jin et al., 2015), was realized in December 2017, with the largest fire in the history of California (the “Thomas fire” that burned 282,000 acres, https://www.vox.com/2017/12/27/16822180/thomas-fire-california-largest-wildfire). This catastrophic fire embodies the sorts of positive feedbacks and interacting factors that could catch humanity off-guard and produce a true apocalyptic event. Record-breaking rains produced an extraordinary flush of new vegetation, that then dried out as record heat waves and dry conditions took hold, coupled with stronger than normal winds, and ignition. Of course the record-fire released CO2 into the atmosphere, thereby contributing to future warming. Out of all types of feedbacks, water vapor and the ice-albedo feedbacks are the most clearly understood mechanisms. Losses in reflective snow and ice cover drive up surface temperatures, leading to even more melting of snow and ice cover—this is known as the ice-albedo feedback (Curry, Schramm, & Ebert, 1995). As snow and ice continue to melt at a more rapid pace, millions of people may be displaced by flooding risks as a consequence of sea level rise near coastal communities (Biermann & Boas, 2010; Myers, 2002; Nicholls et al., 2011). The water vapor feedback operates when warmer atmospheric conditions strengthen the saturation vapor pressure, which creates a warming effect given water vapor’s strong greenhouse gas properties (Manabe & Wetherald, 1967). Global warming tends to increase cloud formation because warmer temperatures lead to more evaporation of water into the atmosphere, and warmer temperature also allows the atmosphere to hold more water. The key question is whether this increase in clouds associated with global warming will result in a positive feedback loop (more warming) or a negative feedback loop (less warming). For decades, scientists have sought to answer this question and understand the net role clouds play in future climate projections (Schneider et al., 2017). Clouds are complex because they both have a cooling (reflecting incoming solar radiation) and warming (absorbing incoming solar radiation) effect (Lashof, DeAngelo, Saleska, & Harte, 1997). The type of cloud, altitude, and optical properties combine to determine how these countervailing effects balance out. Although still under debate, it appears that in most circumstances the cloud feedback is likely positive (Boucher et al., 2013). For example, models and observations show that increasing greenhouse gas concentrations reduces the low-level cloud fraction in the Northeast Pacific at decadal time scales. This then has a positive feedback effect and enhances climate warming since less solar radiation is reflected by the atmosphere (Clement, Burgman, & Norris, 2009). The key lesson from the long list of potentially positive feedbacks and their interactions is that runaway climate change, and runaway perturbations have to be taken as a serious possibility. Table 2 is just a snapshot of the type of feedbacks that have been identified (see Supplementary material for a more thorough explanation of positive feedback loops). However, this list is not exhaustive and the possibility of undiscovered positive feedbacks portends even greater existential risks. The many environmental crises humankind has previously averted (famine, ozone depletion, London fog, water pollution, etc.) were averted because of political will based on solid scientific understanding. We cannot count on complete scientific understanding when it comes to positive feedback loops and climate change.’

#### Only growth solves warming fast enough – markets force sustainability.

Fedrizzi 15 [Rick Fedrizzi, CEO, US Green Building Council, 11-30-2015, "Capitalism is the solution to climate change," CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2015/11/30/capitalism-is-the-solution-to-climate-change-commentary.html]

Environmentalists around the world are pinning their hopes on the international climate talks happening now. But conference rooms in Paris are not where the action on climate change really is. Rather, it's in boardrooms around the world. Companies large and small are taking steps to protect the environment, while increasing their profits. They're motivated not by consensus or conservation, but by cold hard cash. It's true that industry has contributed enormously to climate change and environmental degradation. Business interests have long opposed sustainable practices they believed would negatively impact profits. And the environmental community has held fast to this dynamic, holding up industry and capitalism as the enemy for decades. But the truth is that capitalism is the only force strong enough and capable of acting quickly enough to address climate change before the damage becomes irreversible. I've seen the kind of positive effect business can have on our environment when driven by profit and economic growth — and in one of the world's largest, dirtiest industries no less: real estate. In 1993, I co-founded the U.S. Green Building Council (USGBC), a non-profit organization dedicated to sustainability in our built environment. USGBC created a voluntary rating system — Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design, or LEED — which allows buildings to earn credits for their sustainable features, including energy and water efficiency, indoor environmental quality, and recycled materials. LEED has had a dramatic impact on profits and the planet. In just 15 short years, 14 billion square feet of real estate have been LEED registered and certified in more than 150 countries, including some of the most iconic buildings in the world, from the Chrysler Building in Manhattan, which reduced energy use by 21 percent, to Lincoln Financial Field, home of the Philadelphia Eagles, which has reduced its energy consumption by the equivalent of removing 41,000 cars per year from the road. Thanks to LEED, as legendary environmentalist Paul Hawken put it, "USGBC may have had a greater impact than any other single organization in the world on materials saved, toxins eliminated, greenhouse gases avoided, and human health enhanced." But the benefits are more than just environmental — they're economic. From hospitals to schools to skyscrapers to factories, communities and companies that have invested in LEED see energy savings, cost savings, and a significant return on their investment. And green buildings haven't only been profitable for building owners, but also for the American economy at large. Green construction added $167.4 billion to the U.S. GDP from 2011 to 2014, according to a new 2015 Green Building Economic Impact Study. This year, the green building sector will employ more than 2.3 million Americans, and by 2018, it is expected to nearly double in size. Of course, real estate isn't the only industry where economic and environmental benefits align. Today, the power of sustainability to drive profits is being quietly embraced throughout the global economy, and major companies are reaping the benefits. Take United Technologies, the manufacturing powerhouse that ranks 45th on the Fortune 500 list. Between 2006 and 2014, UTC reduced its greenhouse gas emissions by 30 percent, and water use by 33 percent. Over those same eight years, its stock price more than doubled. Unilever, one of the world's largest consumer-goods companies, has reduced emissions by 37 percent since 2008, and its efforts have saved the company more than 400 million euros (US$422 million). GE's Ecomagination program has boosted its top line by $200 billion over the past decade, growing at four times the rate of the company at large. Last year, Siemens' Environmental Portfolio not only eliminated 428 million tons of CO2 emissions for its customers, but also brought in €33 billion. The list goes on and on. As Patagonia's CEO Yvon Chouinard says: "Every time we've made a decision that's right for the planet, it's made us more money." The private sector has long been seen as the enemy of environmentalism, and for good reason. But times have changed. Today, a select number of enlightened corporations are wasting less, earning more, and proving just how profitable sustainability can be. There's no reason to keep waiting for an elusive climate agreement. Instead, let's take action to advance market-driven solutions that have the potential — and the ability — to save the planet. It's time for environmentalists and business leaders to leverage the profit motive to achieve our common goal: a sustainable, profitable future.

#### Language not reality

Pullum 18 [Geoffrey K. Pullum is Professor of general Linguistics in the School of Philosophy, Psychology, and Language at the University of Edinburgh. “Linguistics: Why it Matters.” Page 55-57]

The largely false tale of the many words for snow in Eskimoan languages often plays a role in discussions of what is commonly called the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis. It’s supposed to be a hypothesis about how language shapes or determines thought, but it isn’t really a hypothesis at all. It’ a vaguely defined cluster of very different claims.

Some variants appear to suggest that the way you think about the world is entirely determined by your language: a person who speaks a different language cannot think the same thoughts, and doesn’t really even see the same world. Such an idea might seem fascinating at first. But on closer inspection it loses any claim to be a scientific thesis.

It has this curious property: if it were true, its truth could never be explained to the people it was true of. For example, if my language gave me a concept that you couldn’t grasp because your language didn’t equip you with that concept, I could never convince you that this was so, because you could never see what I meant. The key thing I would have to get across to you would involve a concept hat you just don’t have and cannot form.

That makes global claims of this sort (claims about our language defining our world) untestable even in principle. It’s not a scientific hypothesis; it’s a rather strange (and in my view implausible) metaphysical claim that no one can ever confirm or refute. That is part of why linguists are so much less intrigued by global Sapir-Whorf-style claims than nonlinguists.

There are testable claims about how language shapes thinking, however. They are much more modest, and generally involve tasks that involve speaking as well as thinking. For example, it has been shown that when someone has to sort a set of presented objects into their different colour categories, they can distinguish one shade of colour from another somewhat faster if their language has distinct words for those two shades.

But this only says that if you have lifelong experience with a language that uses a certain distinction as the crucial meaning difference between a pair of words, that may enhance the rapidity of your response to the distinction. It says nothing about your not being able to see the difference between a pair of colours that share the same word.